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FOREW ORD

W e coalminers earn our living in one of the m ost dangerous industries in
the world. Our history is characterised by tragedy. The number of dead
and crippled m ineworkers is a reflection of the hostile environment in
which we work.
History has shown us that unless we are prepared to learn from the
lessons of the past we are condemned to repeat our mistakes. Experience
has taught us that there is nothing m ore important in our industry than
safety. For us, it is a constant matter of life and death. There is no single
issue more im portant to our union than the responsibility of ensuring that
when m ineworkers begin their shifts, they are provided with the safest
possible working environment so that at the end of the day they can return
safely to their families and friends.
Disasters such as the one which occurred at Bulli have mobilised
enormous community support for mineworkers' campaigns for improved
safety regulations. Our history shows that employers and management
cannot ensure safety in the mining industry.

Workers m ust also

contribute to this process. However, it will indeed be a tragic day when
safety is sacrificed for profit.
The Bulli disaster is a classic lesson in history.

Aggravated by severe

economic circum stances in 1887 and returning to work after a protracted
strike, the m ineworkers had been forced to sign agreements which
precluded them from questioning any management decisions let alone
taking strike action.

Miners who had raised safety issues under those

circumstances w ere victimised. The neglect of safety issues led to the
explosion at Bulli on March 23, 1887, which claimed the lives of 81 men
and boys. Fifteen years later, another explosion at the nearby Mt. Kembla
mine took the lives o f another 96 mineworkers.
There are many other disasters in our history that could have been
avoided if safety regulations had been strictly enforced. Our union has

fought for, and won the right to elect its own full-time safety officers and
check inspectors, whose responsibility includes the inspection of mines
without notice and ensuring that all safety standards are observed. There
have been improvements in safety regulations in our industry but we
know these standards will not be maintained and improved upon without
the constant vigilance of our union.
W ith our industry today dominated by giant multinational corporations,
there is the increasing pressure for even greater degrees of deregulation
within the mining industry, including the area of safety.
Once again, in a climate of economic recession and conservative politics,
the time is ripe for an erosion of the role of trade unions at the workplace.
For our part, the United Mine W orkers remains absolutely resolute in
overcoming this threat.
The tragic lessons of the past have shown us that there is no room for
comprom ise where issues of safety are concerned.
Don Dingsdag's book vividly illustrates the validity of our position.

Tony Wilks
General Secretary
United M ine W orkers
Sydney, New South Wales
July, 1993

INTRODUCTION

The importance o f learning from the past is demonstrated in this book by
Don Dingsdag about the Bulli mining disaster o f 1887.
The theme o f the book will be of interest to miners in particular and
workers in general. W hile the story of the Bulli disaster will be highly
relevant to students of Australian labour history, it also has implications
for students studying education, industrial relations, occupational health
and safety, politics and sociology.
The Bulli disaster clearly illustrates that people frequently disregard the
lessons o f history.

In his analysis of the inquiry which followed the

tragedy at Bulli, Don Dingsdag details the role of the state in that inquiry
process. The specific role o f the government of the day in the enactment
o f coalmining legislation provides a fascinating glimpse into N.S.W.
politics in the late 1880s.

The tasks of the colliery and government

officials are also described in this treatment of the Bulli disaster.
Don Dingsdag's examination of issues relating to safety within the
coalmining industry is pertinent given the increased focus on safety in
industry in today's world. In the 1880s, however, coal mining legislation
was vague and imprecise with too many 'let out' clauses. Phrases such as
'whenever deem ed necessary', 'within a reasonable time' and 'as far as
practicable' appear often in the legislation and these phrases provide a
clue to the causes of the 1887 disaster.
History has shown us that the rigid adherence to the principle of payment
strictly by result can have dire consequences, especially in high risk
industries.

Don Dingsdag sees this principle as a factor in the many

unsafe practices which flourished in nineteenth century coalmining where
injuries and death were common occurrences.
The investigation o f the enforcement o f coalmining legislation and the
role o f the N.S.W . D epartm ent of Mines in the process provides examples

o f industry practices in the 1880s. The influence of Government in the
coalmining industry at that time was m ainly confined to the regulatory
function of the Department of Mines and its inspectorate. Thus, the work
of inspectors and the impact of their performance had profound effects in
N.S.W . coalmines. There were never enough inspectors and coalmining
legislation was imprecise in its content and inconsistent in its application.
W hen combined, these factors created a recipe for disaster.
The relationship between government and private enterprise is also an
issue covered in Don Dingsdag's book. The Bulli mining disaster shows
that a fundamental element in developing an understanding of the nature
of official inquiries into coalmining accidents in the coalmining industry
of N.S.W . during the nineteenth century is the phenomenon of the
interlocking of economic and political interests.

The investigation

surrounding the Bulli disaster reveals that parliamentarians and business
people held common interests, a situation which may well have
influenced safety issues. The events at Bulli also highlight the potential
problems that can arise with close relationship between government and
private enterprise.
In the instance of the Bulli disaster, the Government's response to the
inquest verdict was to appoint a Royal Commission composed of
Commissioners who appeared to

have been biased in favour of the

Governm ent and the Bulli Coal M ining Company. The Government was
able to arrange these favourable conditions by virtue of the powers vested
in Cabinet to call for a Royal Commission, to choose its terms of
reference and to select its Commissioners.
In his description o f the social relations of production in nineteenth
century

coalmining

in

N.S.W .,

Don

Dingsdag

reveals

both

an

unconscious and sometimes intentional disregard for safety by nearly all
those involved with the industry. He suggests that an economic rationale
frequently eroded any serious consideration of the issue of safety. The
manner in which the coalmining legislation had been framed and the
ineffectual way it was enforced also contributed to the disregard of safety.

The inadequacy o f the investigative processes into mining disasters can
also be seen as a contributing factor to the lack o f success by
governments in preventing major mine accidents in the twentieth century
despite improvements in technology and safety legislation since the early
1900s.
The concentration by Don Dingsdag on selected responses to a single
event in an historical perspective succinctly highlights the influence of
the political and economic ideologies which pervaded the N.S.W. coal
mining industry in the latter parts of the last century.
As a lesson from the past, the terrible calamity at Bulli begs the question
’how could the M t. Kem bla disaster happen just a few short years after
Bulli?'.

This book provides a lesson from the past as Australia

approaches the close of another century. W hether this lesson is heeded
will depend on the responses of all people who are prepared to become
active participants in shaping the future.
Once one has read Don Dingsdag's account of the Bulli disaster, the role
that education can play in the process of making mining a safer working
environment and making people more aware of the importance o f safety
issues in industry is evident.
This book can play an im portant role in an educative process aimed at
enhancing working conditions in the mining industry. Teachers, miners,
company directors, trade unionists, Members of Parliament and members
of the wider society all have a role to play in this educative process.

Michael M Berrell
Faculty o f Education
University o f Southern Queensland
July, 1993
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CHAPTER ONE
1

The Bulli M ining Disaster: an Introduction

On W ednesday, 23 March 1887, at 2.30 p.m. an explosion
occurred at the Bulli Colliery in New South Wales (N.S.W.), Australia
which resulted in the deaths of 81 men and boys. A t the time this was
Australia's largest coalmine disaster and today remains the second worst
mine related disaster in Australian history.

Together with the 1902

Mount Kembla m ine tragedy in which 96 miners perished, these events
remind us of the dangers faced by miners as a part of their working day.
The force of the explosion at Bulli, magnified by the presence of
coaldust [1], was restricted to a small section of the mine and killed
instantly those m iners who worked in close proximity to the site o f the
blast. Those who survived the initial force of the explosion died from the
effects o f asphyxiant afterdamp, a poisonous mixture of gases nearly
always encountered after a coalmine explosion.

Immediately after the

initial explosion several heroic rescue parties entered the mine. These
men undertook this rescue task not knowing if there were any survivors or
if successive explosions would cause the mine to collapse.

The full

horror of the tragedy began to unfold when the disfigured bodies of the
miners were brought to the surface. This occurred amidst the panic and
anxiety o f the miners' next-of-kin who by that time had assembled at the
mine. The immensity of the disaster presented several problems for the
Bulli community. In terms of health problems, there were no adequate
mortuary facilities available.

In addition, the lack of government

sponsored social services in the nineteenth century meant that either the
private sector or the community would have to provide for the widows
and dependents of the deceased miners. The importance of these social
service and health issues are alluded to in the secondary title of the book,
lessons fro m the past.

They are treated in a general manner in the

conclusion. In the light of these lessons from the past there is a pressing
need today to examine these aspects of coalmining life.
Until recently the body of historical literature on Australian
coalmine disasters was an under-represented field of study [2],

Issues
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pertaining to rescue and charitable relief operations as well as the grief
such

coalmining

communities

experienced

after disasters

of the

magnitude o f Bulli have been discussed in orthodox studies of disasters.
The focus of this book is a hitherto almost neglected area of Australian
historiography, that of the official inquiry into coalmining accidents m ore precisely, it is an investigation into the role of the state in this area.
Another purpose is to examine the process of one other significant sphere
of governm ent activity, the enactment of coal mining legislation in
Parliament. The book also investigates the role o f the most significant
governm ent department in the N.S.W . coal mining industry during the
nineteenth century, the Department of Mines.
This wider investigation o f government activity is motivated by
the response of the N.S.W. Government to the Bulli disaster as well as the
reactions o f the Bulli Coal M ining Company and the Department of
Mines inspectorate.

To a lesser extent, the book also investigates the

actions o f the miners and their union, the Illawarra Miners' Mutual
Protective Association (IMMPA). The explosion at the Bulli mine was
first investigated by a mandatory inquest which exonerated the miners
and found against both the Government and the Bulli Coal Mining
Company. If the inquest verdict would have been left unchallenged, the
Governm ent would have been embarrassed by evidence which clearly
pointed to the incompetence of officials within the Department of Mines
and the exposure o f the ineffectiveness of the 1876 Coal Mines
Regulation Act (CMRA). The parliamentary processes that produced such
weak legislation would also have come under close scrutiny.

An

uncontested finding would also have resulted in a hefty financial liability
and the probable financial ruin of the Bulli Coal Mining Company.
T he Government's response to the inquest verdict was to appoint
a Royal Commission which made a report (Bulli Colliery Accident,
Report o f Royal Commission; together with the minutes o f evidence and
appendices, hereafter referred to as 'the Royal Commission' or 'the
Commission') composed of commissioners who were biased in favour of
the Governm ent and the Bulli Coal M ining Company. The Government
was able to arrange these favourable conditions by virtue of the powers
vested in cabinet to call for Royal Commissions and to choose the
Commission's terms of reference and composition. The Cabinet of the
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Parkes' administration in N.S.W . in

1887, replete with coalmine

proprietors, was aided in this process by both houses o f parliament, which
were also over represented by men who held coalmining interests or who
were sympathetic toward the industry.

This set o f interlocking

relationships between coalmine owners and parliament is the mainspring
of the wider investigation of this book, viz, the role o f government in
nineteenth century coalmining in N.S.W. There are clearly lessons to be
learned from the past from this historical investigation.
Governm ent functions are numerous and complex.

However,

the totality of governm ent instrumentalities involved in the coalmining
industry o f N.S.W . for the larger part of the nineteenth century is beyond
the scope of this book. The diversity o f government participation and
influence in the coalmining industry discussed here is not complete.
Aside from passing only four coalmining acts during the nineteenth
century, governm ent involvement in the coalmining industry was mainly
confined to the administration o f legislation which was delegated to the
Department of Mines and its inspectorate. The actions of this department
and its inspectorate had a profound impact on the Bulli disaster.
It will be shown below that the other functions o f the
Department of M ines, which included survey work, also held implications
for the Bulli disaster.

In a broader context, unsafe mining practices

elsewhere in the Colony were also affected by this moribund department.
As well, the other branches of government including those responsible for
public schooling and health, influenced the daily lives of both coalmining
families and employers. The pervasiveness of government was felt by
company officials and miners alike who were directly affected by
government in many ways. Managers who in some instances were also
magistrates adjudicated over breaches of the Coal M ines Regulation Act
by either workers or in some cases fellow managers. The partisanship of
the relationship between government and employers was such that miners
could be charged by managers under the Act for swearing at work.
W hile the influence of government was pervasive, this book
identifies a lack of government conviction in the pursuit o f investigations
into the ways in which coalmine owners operated their mines.

The

terrible calamity at Bulli is indicative of the biased relationship which
existed between coalmine owners and government.
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governments did not act decisively to make coalmines safer until 1912
when the Coal M ines Regulation A ct was introduced raises the question
of the extent o f collusion between government and private enterprise,
especially during the latter part o f the nineteenth century.

The

inadequacy of the investigative process into the causes o f mining
disasters can also be seen as a contributing factor to the appalling record
of governments in preventing m ajor mine accidents in the twentieth
century despite improvements in technology and the introduction of new
legislation since the early 1900s. Accordingly, the major theme of this
book is an analysis of the official responses to the Bulli disaster and the
lessons that m ajor mining accidents provide for contemporary society.
The social, political and economic history of Bulli is mentioned in those
instances where the information illuminates the process of official
inquiry.
W hile research has been conducted into some aspects of the
coalmining industry during the nineteenth century, for the purpose of the
argument developed here, such research is either too general or too
narrow in its application in the context of the approach taken in this book.
For those who wish to pursue a more general treatment of coalmining, M.
H. Ellis' A Saga o f Coal [3] describes the development of the northern
coalfields of N.S.W.. This work provides a non-scientific and sometimes
biased view o f the formative years of the Newcastle-Wallsend Coal
Company and the company's reaction to the development of unionism in
the Newcastle district. Ellis tends to ignore the role of government in
matters of safety and the book can be interpreted as an apology for the
company's role in the highly competitive embryonic stages of the N.S.W.
coalmining industry.

Ellis neither discusses the Bulli disaster in depth

nor the general implications of government activity for either society at
large or the coalmining industry. Some researchers, however, do refer to
the Bulli disaster and indicate the need for greater government
intervention in the regulation of coalmining safety. Robin Gollan's The
Coalminers o f N ew South Wales [4], for example, analysed the Bulli
disaster, but did not come to grips fully with the problems associated with
the official inquiries into the disaster.

Gollan was predominantly

concerned with the development of unionism in the coalmining industry.
However, Gollan was very critical o f the parliamentary machinations
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which delayed the enactment of a new CMRA which was introduced in
1887 but not enacted until 1896. In A History o f the M iners' Federation
o f Australia [5] E. Ross was mainly concerned with the struggle of
unionism in the coalfields. Nevertheless, he referred to the Bulli disaster
and deplored the neglect o f safety requirements by governments. A more
recent work by Stuart Piggin and Henry Lee, The M t Kembla Disaster [6],
fills the gap in the literature cited above. A significant portion of this
book is devoted to the legal, industrial and political responses to the Mt.
Kembla disaster.

As with the Bulli disaster fifteen years earlier, the

aftermath of the Mt. Kembla disaster produced similar outcomes. After
several

lengthy

inquiries,

including

a Royal

Commission

which

recommended extensive changes to coalmining legislation, the blame for
the explosion at Mt. Kembla (as in the case of Bulli) was put down to the
carelessness of workers rather than a lack of purpose by government,
mine owners, m anagers and officials in enforcing the CMRA [7]. A focus
on official responses to the Bulli disaster highlights the influence of
political and economic thought of the time. By placing the responses to
Bulli in an historical perspective, the verdict of the inquest held to
investigate the Bulli Colliery explosion can be seen to have been
subverted by the subsequent Bulli Royal Commission established by the
Parkes Government.
A fundamental element in understanding the nature of the
subversion o f the original inquest is the interlocking o f economic and
political interests in the coalmining industry of N.S.W. during the
nineteenth century.

There were already many problems inherent in

nineteenth century coalmining legislation due to the influence of
parliamentary coalmine owners long before the Bulli explosion of 1887.
By the late 1880s coalmine owners and other men of property were well
entrenched in the N.S.W . Parliament. In fact, this association was well
established before the Colony was made self-governing in 1856. It is not
entirely surprising that only men of wealth were members o f Parliament.
There were restrictive property qualifications which prevented working
men from being elected or appointed to the Legislative Council. When
the entirely elected Legislative Assembly came into being in 1856 only
two working men could afford to enter Parliament until 1891 after
payment for parliamentarians was legislated. Consequently, before 1891
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the framing o f coalmining legislation occurred in parliaments which
consisted of m em bers who were involved financially in coalmining to
various degrees.

Some parliamentarians were coalmine owners while

others had interests in allied industries such as gasmaking, foundries and
shipping, all o f which were dependent on coal as a source of fuel as well
as income. This is not to suggest that Parliament or its members were
corrupt.

However, when decisions or laws were made which affected

their business concerns such decisions would have been influenced by
personal considerations even though members often claimed to the
contrary. Notwithstanding, this is not to imply that there was something
sinister or conspiratorial about the coalm ine proprietors, landowners, or
lawyers

who

dominated

Parliament.

Rather,

their prominence in

Parliament was the result of political and social structures which existed
in the era before self-government and became a norm of society in
N.S.W. after 1856.
W hether the vagueness ;md imprecise nature of coalmining
legislation was intentional, the fact remains that there were many 'let out'
Clauses in the legislation. Clauses such as 'whenever deemed necessary',
'within a reasonable time' and 'as far as practicable' seem to suggest that
coalmine owners placed private gain before public good. Owing to the
imprecise nature of legislation, D epartm ent of Mines inspectors were
often incapable of enforcing the law. To complicate matters further there
were not enough inspectors. Colliery and government officials were not
alone in their dereliction of duly.

A review of nineteenth century

legislation presented in Chapter Seven reveals that the disregard for
safety by managers and others at the workplace was both intentional and
unintentional.

This lack of concern for safety issues was accepted as

normal.
The 1854 Coal Mines Act was the first piece of legislation to
address coalmining safety.

This legislation dealt only with the

registration and inspection of coalmines [8], For example, no section was
explicitly devoted to safety regulations, neither did the act forbid the
employment of women or very young children. Sometimes children were
employed in N.S.W . coalmines [9].

The 1854 Act caused coalmine

proprietors little concern. The Act's only mandatory requirement was that
owners supplied the examiner of coal mines with copies of their colliery's
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plans. The examiner's duties included the role of chief inspector, assayer
and surveyor.

Under the A ct, no other inspector was appointed and

consequently part of the examiner's brief was to inspect regularly all of
N.S.W.'s collieries which increased from 12 in 1854 to 18 in 1861.
However, m ost of the examiner's time was taken advising the government
on the valuation of all minerals [10].

Consequently, there was little

chance that the exam iner could inspect all of the Colony's collieries, even
on an irregular basis. The 1862 Coal Fields Regulation Act made several
improvements but fell far short of making mines safer.

It expressly

prohibited the employm ent of persons under 13 years o f age and women
of any age.

The A ct's m ajor stipulations included the reporting of

accidents; the provision of two egresses or exits in every mine, a less than
satisfactory definition o f 'adequate' ventilation; the fencing off of
dangerous sections; the locking of safety lamps; regulations for steamengines and boilers; the establishment of Special Rules which governed
safety at individual mines; a comprehensive schedule of penalties; and
specific but lim ited powers for inspectors and the examiner of coalfields.
The Act appeared to be an impressive piece of legislation but in reality it
proved to be a paper tiger.
The m omentum for a new act had come from the recently
reformed Northern (Newcastle) district miners' union which soon after its
establishment in M ay 1860 sent a petition to Parliament calling for an
improvement in legislation. The failure to obtain a suitable response to
its petition for improved ventilation and other demands prompted the
union to nominate a miner, Thomas Lewis, for the Northumberland
electorate in the 1860 general election [11], Lewis, who had been very
active in the establishm ent o f the union, was initially responsible for the
introduction of the 1862 Act in Parliament. As the first and only working
man in N.S.W. parliament, Lewis was probably not a frequent speaker but
he nevertheless persuaded the Premier to introduce the Bill [12],
Subsequently, he resigned his seat in 1862 when he became one of the
three Department of M ines Coal Fields Branch inspectors. From 1864
until 1881 he was the only inspector for the entire Colony.
The parliamentary coalmine owners who ensured a tortuous
passage o f subsequent legislation were already well established in
Parliament which gave them the opportunity to moderate the more
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demanding Clauses of the 1862 Bill. M ajor opposition to the Bill came in
particular from the Legislative Council which had a small but influential
nucleus of coalmine owners as members. However, there is a problem if
Parliament is seen as only the hand-maiden o f private enterprise [131. If
it always performs functions biased in favour of private enterprise, how
did this legislation get beyond its first reading? For that matter, how was
the legislation introduced initially? A plausible explanation is that not all
parliamentarians were ill-disposed towards legislation of this kind. The
1862 Bill became a political football for reasons other than the
machinations o f parliamentary coalmine owners.

The relationship

between private enterprise and parliam ent is far more problematic and
complex than simple explanations which suggest a permanent collusion
between the two sectors. Despite a conservative element in the N.S.W.
Parliament and members with direct involvement in the coalmining
industry, the prevailing philosophy from the early 1860s to the late 1880s
was liberal in character. Charles Cowper, the liberals' leader in his third
term as Premier, introduced the Coal Fields Regulation Bill in 1861.
However, because of the wrangle with the Legislative Council over the
Robertson Land Acts the Council rejected several important pieces of
legislation [14].

Cowper reintroduced the Bill in the next session, and

after its failure to reach the Council, reintroduced it again in 1862. It was
then referred to a Select Committee, drastically amended and finally
passed in late 1862.
The composition of die Select Committee provides a prime
example of political abuse and cynicism. O f its seven members, four had
direct interests in coalmining. Bourn Russell and James Mitchell were
both

Newcastle

mine

superintendent of the

owners

and Francis

Australian

Merewether was

Agricultural

coalmines as well as being Mitchell's son-in-law.

the

Company's (AACo)
Charles Kemp, the

Committee Chairman, was also the Newcastle W allsend Coal Mining
Company chairman, a director o f two steamship companies and the
director of the Australian Gas Light Company [15]. A major objection to
the Bill was that the original provision compelled owners to deposit mine
plans with government authorities.

Parliamentarians in both houses

argued vehemently against this 'invasion of privacy' which according to
their reasoning, would enable competitors to view plans and gain an
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economic advantage. O f course, the depositing o f plans was a sensible
safety precaution and in the event of a serious accident this requirement
would assist in any rescue operations.
W ith legislation in place, the next step for government was to
undertake the administration of the law. Under Cowper's premiership the
Coal Fields Branch briefly flourished, becoming a semi-autonomous
branch within the Department of Lands with W illiam Keene the examiner
as its head. Cow per expanded the Coal Fields Branch by appointing three
additional inspectors and an examiner for the Illawarra district. The latter
position was taken up by John Mackenzie, a colliery viewer (overseer)
and mining engineer, who was heavily implicated in the Bulli disaster.
Curiously, as a witness at the 1862 Select Committee, Mackenzie denied
the need for examiners or inspectors and vigorously attacked most of the
Bill's provisions [16]. Nevertheless, M ackenzie was appointed in early
1863 and it appears that he had overcome his objections in the light of his
salary which was £400 per annum.

Thomas Lewis was one of the

inspectors [17] appointed after he was forced to vacate his seat in
Parliament. Because there was no payment for M embers of Parliament,
Lewis was supported by a levy of the northern union membership.
However, in 1861 at the instigation of the AACo, the northern coalmine
owners form ed a loose association, the actions o f which caused the
disintegration o f the district union in 1862. Accordingly Lewis' source of
income disappeared.

He resigned his seat and accepted the £300 p.a.

inspector's appointment. The expansion of the Coal Fields Branch was
cut short in 1863 when James Martin, Cowper's former ally but now his
political enemy, became Premier o f N.S.W..

Under the Martin

administration two positions of inspector were abolished in June 1864.
Besides Lewis, M ackenzie remained until August 1865 when he resigned
his position. From that time until 1883 the Coal Fields Branch had only
two field operatives even though the num ber of m ines in N.S.W. more
than doubled from 24 to 51 during that period.
Little is known of the early activities of the Coal Fields Branch,
especially its m ost important function - the inspection of mines.

Yet,

from the earliest published Department o f Mines Annual Reports, it is
painfully obvious that Lewis could not inspect every mine. In addition to
being an inspector of mines he was required to investigate serious
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accidents and to be present at coroners' inquests when deaths occurred in
coalmines. Lewis' workload was not lightened by Keene the examiner.
Keene not only performed the field duties of assaying minerals but was
also the principal administrator. Consequently, Lewis was left to inspect
all the mines. The situation worsened when Keene resigned in 1873 and
was replaced by M ackenzie, the former examiner of coal fields for the
Illawarra. M ackenzie steadfastly refused to inspect mines because he felt
it was beneath the dignity of his 'high' position [18].
The lack o f mine inspections did not improve under the auspices
o f the 1876 Coal M ines Regulation Act which had repealed the 1862 Act.
In fact, as the number of mines increased under Lewis' term of office to
more than 40, the enforcement of the 1876 CMRA became almost
impossible.

Lewis' successor, James Rowan, was supposed to inspect

more than 50 mines until 1883 when another inspector, John Dixon, was
appointed.

In 1887 Rowan and Dixon were joined by Thomas Bates.

From 1874 until 1895 the fractious M ackenzie remained the head of the
Coal Fields Branch. From 1874, M ackenzie was responsible directly to
the Under Secretary for Mines who was the permanent head responsible
only to the Secretary for Mines who was also M inister for Lands.
The Coal Fields Branch under Mackenzie had a questionable
attitude to the reporting of accidents, but its performance in accident
prevention and safety was reprehensible. This was in part due to not only
the ineffectiveness o f the 1876 Act but also to the lack of zeal on the part
o f M ackenzie and the inspectorate.

The feeble nature of the Act

originated with its tortuous passage through the Parliament. Originally
introduced as an amendment to the 1862 Act, it lapsed in the Legislative
Council in 1865-66. In 1873 following the 1873 Select Committee [19] a
new Coal M ines Regulation Bill was introduced and suspended while the
two legislative chambers deliberated its enactment. It was finally passed
in 1876 [20].

It is possible that these delays were a direct result of

deliberate tactics by those Members of Parliament who may have stood to
lose financially.

N ot only were those interested parties successful in

delaying the implementation of legislation but they also succeeded in
watering down the legislation during its passage through Parliament.
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N.S.W . Parliament and the Coalmine Owners
A pivotal argument of this book is that the Bulli Royal
Commission was intentionally tilled with members who would counteract
the verdict o f the inquest. The bias of the jurors at the inquest held at
Bulli, who w ere em bittered by the tragedy, had incriminated the company
and the Department o f M ines. The Government was embarrassed by the
press of the day and had created the Royal Commission in that context.
The Government chose its members and determined its terms of
reference.

W ith its parliamentary connections, the Bulli Coal Mining

Company aided the Government in this design in order to avoid monetary
and judicial retribution.

Ostensibly, the Royal Commission had been

fashioned to inquire into the cause of the explosion at the Bulli mine and
to

make

recommendations

that

would

contribute

to

a

general

improvement of ventilation and safety precautions for the mining industry
as a whole.

However, in reality a laissez-faire attitude towards the

improvement of safety regulations prevailed in parliamentary circles.
The interlocking of economic interests in the N.S.W. Parliament
had a significant influence during the course of the Commission. This
factor also had an impact on the outcome.

In 1887, the N.S.W.

Parliament was teeming with members who would have suffered a
financial loss if prohibitive safety measures were introduced by
legislation as a result o f the recommendations made by the Commission.
Regardless o f the m any escape Clauses in the report, costs would have
escalated inordinately if additional supervisory staff, expensive drilling of
extra ventilation shafts and anti-coaldust equipment had to be introduced
to meet the requirements of CMRA.
An investigation [21] of the financial interests of N.S.W.
parliamentarians in 1887 revealed that at least 22 Legislative Councillors
were directors or owners of coalmines.

A further three members had

extensive interests in associated companies, mainly the steamship lines.
At least 25 o f the Legislative Assembly's 124 members were directors or
owners of coalmines and two members were directors of steam
navigation companies.

In this light, the Ministry or Cabinet which

housed the ultimate pow er of state, can be viewed as the epitome of
interlocking economic and oolitical interests.
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The Parkes Ministry consisted of ten ministers, of whom seven
were directors or proprietors of coalmines.

These people included Sir

Henry Parkes, the Premier and Colonial Secretary who owned 4,000 acres
of coalmine leases at Jamberoo; M r John Fitzgerald Bums, Colonial
Treasurer and Director of unspecified coalmine companies; and Mr
Thomas Garrett, Secretary for Lands and owner of 68,000 acres of
mineral leases who was also Chairman and Director of several other
coalmining companies. Others of influence included M r John Sutherland,
Secretary o f Public Works and a partner of Sir Henry Parkes at Jamberoo;
M r Jam es Inglis, Minister of Public Instruction who was also Chairman
of the Sydney Harbour Collieries; and M r Charles James Roberts,
Postmaster General and Director of unspecified coalmining concerns. Mr
James Nixon Brunker, who became Secretary of Lands after Thomas
Garrett, was also a director of several coalmining companies.
The Ministry listed the Commissioners, chose the Commission's
chairman, and gave these people the terms o f reference which, arguably,
guaranteed a favourable outcome.

W ith these appointments, vested

interests were able to locate the blam e with the miners.

The miner

provided a convenient victim, as he had neither the political nor legal
avenues at his disposal to counter the attack of the parliamentarian cum
coalmine owner.
This reciprocal relationship between government and private
interests holds true for all coalmining companies investigated in this
paper. For example, in 1862, George W igram Allen, who was elected to
the Legislative Council in 1860, appeared as the solicitor before
Parliament in the incorporation of the Bulli Coal Mining Company [22],
At the same time, the Osborne W allsend Company, also represented by
Allen, was incorporated.

Before the same Parliamentary Select

Committee, W illiam Speer appeared as director for both companies and
the only witness. Speer was later to become the member for W est Sydney
in 1869.

Parliamentary connections would prove extremely useful for

these companies in gaining concessions for private railways, harbours and
jetties [23], Although the now knighted Allen resigned from the N.S.W.
Assembly in 1883 and had died a few years prior to the Bulli disaster, the
business connections he had made during his 15 years of Parliamentary
service would have been exceedingly useful to his beneficiaries who
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retained a large share in the Bulli Company in 1887. Sir George Allen
was Managing Director o f the Bulli Coal Mining Company until 1885, his
father George Allen, Chairman of Committees of the Legislative Council
1856-73, also served as a Director on the board. The family connection
also enhanced Sir George Allen's eligibility as a director o f companies in
associated industries.

He served as director of many steamship and

mining companies as well as the Australian Gaslight Company [24], and
benefited financially from these directorships. The family legal business
of Allen, Allen and Bowden consisted of father and son and a cousin and
acted for m ost of the above mentioned companies, including the Bulli
Coal Mining Company. Sir George Allen's personal annual income was
estimated to be some £15,000 in 1876 [25], and the extent of his
parliamentary influence was such that Sir Henry Parkes was indebted to
him on several occasions [26], borrowing £9,000 from him on one
occasion [27].
At a local level the Allen family concern was able to exert a
powerful economic influence on the north Illawarra District. Just to the
north of the Bulli mine, Sir George owned a large acreage of mining
freehold known as the North Illawarra Coal M ining Company [28], The
towns of Austinmer and Coledale, some 16 kilometres north of Bulli, owe
the naming o f several localities to the Allen family - Allen Park, Allen
Street and W igram Road in Austinmer are obvious reminders of the
family's influence. Less obvious are Toxteth Avenue, Austinmer which
was named after Sir George's residence in Glebe, an inner suburb of
Sydney.

Boyce Avenue in Austinmer was so named in honour of his

wife's maiden name.

The naming of Hemsley Place in Coledale was

derived from the partner who joined the family firm in 1894. The name
Allen, Allen and Bowden was changed to Allen, Allen and Hemsley, and
this group subsequently became the legal counsel for E. Vickery [29],
Mr Ebenezer Vickery M.L.C., the owner of several coalmining
companies in the Illawarra district, was also a director of the Bulli Coal
M ining company by 1887.

M r E. Vickery, M r George Alfred Lloyd,

M.L.C., Director of the Bulli Company and M r George Hamilton, the
company’s Secretary, in their capacity as administrators of the Bulli
Relief Fund established to care for the families o f the deceased miners,
had dissuaded the widows and legatees from instigating proceedings
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against the company for damages [30], The miners' beneficiaries were
entitled under the Employers' Liability Act o f 1886, to three years of
estimated earnings [31].

Vickery, Lloyd and Hamilton, undoubtedly

worried about the company's financial losses during the preceding half
yearly trading period, assured the widows that they would be maintained
adequately by the Bulli Relief Fund [32].

Litigation by the miners'

beneficiaries, based on a three yearly average per person employed in the
same industry and district, would have threatened the company's
economic viability. The earning capacity of miners in the district would
have averaged between £1-15-0 and to £1-19-0 per week [33].

The

majority o f the 81 victims were miners while 20 or so were 'off-hand' or
auxiliary workers earning an estimated £1 per week.

The costs to the

company would have been considerable if the earning capacity of the
deceased men was taken into account. An estimate o f the costs can be
made by calculating the total of 20 wages at £1-0-0 per week and 60
wages at £1-15-0. The action against the company would have amounted
to nearly £20,000, a sum greater than the company had earned in profits.
The subversion of the inquest verdict became important for these
reasons, not only for the Government of the day, but also for the
company. The judgem ent of the Royal Commission created at the behest
of a Parliam ent which included the proprietors of several coalmines
including the Bulli Coal Mining Company, exonerated the Government
and the company and implicated the miners as causal agents in the
disaster that struck Bulli on the afternoon of Wednesday, 23 March, 1887.
Notwithstanding misgivings about inappropriate parliamentary
behaviour, the events after Bulli show the customary influence exerted by
parliamentary coalmine owners extended beyond the legislative process.
The influence of political and economic interests also had far reaching
implications for the Bulli disaster.
Government,

The 1887 Cabinet of the N.S.W.

for example, had arranged the composition

of the

membership of the Commission established to investigate the disaster.
This m ay have been done to produce a favourable outcome.

The

Australian political economist and social historian Ted Wheelwright aptly
summarised the implications of interlocking directorships thus:
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(c)lose links between business and government can become
scandalously close, and Australian political history is replete
with incidents where business firms or wealthy individuals have
used their political connections to direct personal advantage
[34],
Eventually the intervention of the coalmining interests in
Parliament in the passage o f the 1876 CMRA may well have contributed
to the events at Bulli on that fatal Wednesday in

1887.

The

ineffectiveness o f the A ct m eant that an explosion of the magnitude of
Bulli was perhaps inevitable. The weakness of the Act was aggravated by
the understaffed Departm ent of Mines Coalfields Branch inspectorate
which was represented by some negligent officers. Yet, history records
that the Commission's judgem ent effectively exonerated not only
Department o f Mines officials but also the Bulli Coal M ining Company.
J. D. Holmes, in the Australian Law Journal, suggested that
Royal Commissions are the best method by which to obtain information
[35].

However, the m anner of appointment of the members to the

Commission and the outcomes of their deliberations suggest that:
■£)
Royal Commissions may be granted for political ends to persons
unworthy o f compliments - they may be made the instruments of
impertinent in terference... [36],
The Bulli Royal Commission was an instance of 'power abused, of
essential and beneficial prerogatives perverted to serve a sinister object'
[37],
Format of this Book
Chapter O ne serves as a general introduction of the main themes
developed in Uiis book. After briefly outlining the immediate events after
the Bulli disaster the chapter addresses the implications o f the failure of
the official inquiries into the Bulli disaster to resolve the safety breaches
that precipitated the disaster. More generally, this chapter examines the
role of government in the enactment and the maintenance o f coalmining
legislation. Chapter Two deals with the background and development of
Bulli in the context of the economic interaction between the township and
the Bulli Coal M ining Company. The phenomenon o f the interlocking of
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econom ic and political interests is also scrutinised in this chapter.

In

Chapter Three, details of events preceding the inquest held to investigate
the explosion, the selection o f jurors, their prejudices and their verdict are
discussed. The proceedings of the inquest are, however, not treated in
depth.

The implications of the biased verdict directed against the

Departm ent o f Mines and the Bulli Coal Mining Company are seen as
being worthy of m ore intensive comment. Chapter Four deals with the
Parkes Government's need to create the Commission in order to
counteract the inquest verdict. The Commissioners are seen as the agents
o f a Parliam ent intent on securing a favourable verdict for its coalmining
members.

Chapter Five scrutinises the sittings of the Commission and

demonstrates that it was prejudiced in favour of the Department of Mines
and the Bulli Coal Mining Company.
In

Chapter Six, the weakness of the

1876 CMRA, the

effectiveness of the judgements o f its administrators and their possible
collusion with the Bulli Coal Mining Company are discussed. Special
attention is also given to the examiner, Mr John Mackenzie, who held the
position o f head o f the Coal Fields Branch of the Department of Mines.
He alone attributed the explosion at Bulli to sabotage by dynamite. This
accusation, directed at miners, was clearly a ruse and not even the biased
members o f the Commission gave credence to his flight of fancy.
Sections o f this chapter are devoted to a disclosure of Mackenzie's
financial and political connections because in many ways Mackenzie
represented the Coalfields Branch and was one of its important policy
makers. An investigation of the role of the Department of Mines is also
undertaken.
The final chapter examines the Bulli disaster in the context of
the present. It is suggested that history could and should provide valuable
lessons from the past, but in fact such lessons are largely ignored. It is
also implied that more attention should be accorded by the historian to the
area of policy-making and administration of government instrumentalities
and departments for it is within this area that a safer coalmining industry
can be developed.

Also, Royal Commissions in general should not be

seen as being alternatives to judicial inquiries in those cases where the
latter are a duly warranted option for redress.
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CHAPTER TWO
2

Background and Development of Bulli

Safety in Nineteenth Century Coalmines.
Across the bargaining tables of power, the bureaucracies of
business and government face one another, and under the tables
their myriad feet are interlocked in wonderfully complex ways
(C. W right M ills, 1951:79)
Bulli lies 68 kilometres south of Sydney, N.S.W. and 13
kilometres north of the industrial city of Wollongong. It is located on the
narrow coastal plain between the escarpment of the Illawarra Ranges and
the Pacific Ocean. The ranges m eet the sea at Coalcliff and recede about
1.75 kilometres inland at Bulli and approximately 3.5 kilometres at Mt.
Keira.

The average elevation is 300 metres.

The ranges are heavily

forested and contain eight coal seams separated by several beds of shale,
sandstone and igneous rocks.
The coal seams of the Illawarra district are part o f the Sydney
Basin. While the seams are too deep in the Sydney area for mining to be
a viable economic proposition, the seams are closer to the surface in the
Illawarra area to the south of Sydney, at Newcastle to the north and
Lithgow to the west.

At Coalcliff, where mining has only recently

ceased, coal strata are visible five metres above sea level, rising to 150
metres at Bulli. The coalbed today known as the Bulli Seam was known
in 1887 as the '8 foot' seam [1] and by the late 1800s this was the easiest
to work as it contained the thickest and the then most saleable coal
deposits. Therefore, it was considered to be a m ost profitable exercise by
the Bulli Coal Mining Company, despite the fact that the seam was most
affected by the intrusion of ’rolls' and gas-inducing 'dykes' [2],

In the

Balgownie or '4 foot' seam underlying the Bulli seam, no igneous
irregularities were encountered and at Bulli this seam was mined without
the problems that can occur with the presence of gas. The economically
motivated decision by the Bulli Coal Mining Company to mine the Bulli
seam in 1884, despite its gaseous nature, was a contributing factor to the
17
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1887 disaster. The recurring natural cindering, or partial combustion of
coal reduced the value of the Bulli pit, which was further devalued by the
1887 explosion.

The Bulli Coal M ining Company never seemed to

recover completely from the financial setback of this explosion. It was
due to these financial reversals that the m ine was sold in 1895 to George
Adams of Tattersall's fame. It was later to be resold in 1936 to Australian
Iron and Steel (AIS). It was not until well after World War II that AIS,
which by then had become part of Broken Hill Pty Ltd (BHP), was
eventually able to overcome the cindering and variable coal quality
through the application of modem mining techniques.
Previous to the opening of the Bulli mine in 1863, the wealth of
the 'North Illawarra' had been generated mainly through agricultural
production, although the district had originally been a site for cattle
raising and timber felling. Coal was discovered at Bulli as early as 1828
but mining was not permitted because of the Australian Agricultural
Company's monopoly on coalmining [3] which made coalmining other
than mining for the AACo an illegal activity.

In 1848, the AACo's

monopoly was revoked setting (lie scene for coalmining in the Illawarra
district, initially at Mt. Keira in 1849. Due to its steam raising capacity,
Illawarra coal was in high demand in the domestic market for local
shipping and by 1863 after the opening of the Bulli mine coal began to be
exported to Shanghai [4],
The high demand for the Bulli Coal Mining Company's coal
dramatically changed the agricultural and economic character of the Bulli
settlement. The area's present industrial character began to emerge at this
time [5],

A village of 'substantial huts' appeared which were soon

replaced by more substantial dwellings. A school and a few shops also
sprang up near the comp;iny's property [6], The continual growth of the
company resulted in an increasing demand for miners.

With its

increasing importance as an employer the company was in a position to
influence the economic character of the area.

By 1879, Bulli and the

adjacent village o f W oonona had become largely dependent on the Bulli
mine [7], The population of the district increased in direct proportion to
the production o f coal, indicating the tremendous influence the mine
exerted on the surrounding community. The company frequently used its
economic strength to counteract potential industrial action by its workers
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by threatening to reduce wages or to sack the striking workers.
Eventually, the company's ability to dominate the labour market had
direct implications in the causes of the Bulli explosion.
In 1869 the population of Bulli was about 100, yet 90 men from
Bulli and the immediate district were employed at the Bulli pit producing
some 64,000 tons per year. W ithin 12 years there were 645 males in the
district, 317 o f whom worked at the mine [8] until a major strike/lock-out
which lasted from September 1886 to March 1887. In that year some 371
men o f an estimated 845 males in the Bulli-W oonona locality were
employed by the Bulli Coal Mining Company. The strike reduced the
number to only 177 m en [9], The company had also become a major
landlord for its employees by 1887, and with this development the mine
management was able to exert an even greater influence over its
employees. The company was closely identified with the daily life of the
community.
The fluctuation of coal prices in the Sydney and overseas
markets frequently led to a reduction in miners' wages and piece-rates
which resulted in retaliatory strikes by the workers. The 1886-1887 strike
not only affected the Bulli mine, but also the other Illawarra mines. The
incident was m arked with violence directed at outside miners, 'blacklegs'
who were brought in by the coal mining companies to defeat the strike.
Blacklegs were often assaulted and physically prevented from entering
mines by the striking miners. During the strike, the military were brought
in and shots were exchanged. As a result of this incident, several Bulli
miners were prosecuted, fined in court and evicted from company owned
dwellings. Many were forced to live in makeshift accommodation 110].
The cause o f the strike had been the reduction of miners' hewing
rates on a sliding scale proportionate to the reduction of coal prices. The
settlement o f the strike at Bulli in March 1887 was only achieved by
forcing the miners to sign engagement rules stipulating reduced piecerates, while at the same time ensuring rigid management control of
employees.

The terms o f the settlement eventually became a telling

factor in the 1887 disaster because miners claimed in evidence before the
Commission that the strict enforcement of the engagement rules had
prevented them from reporting the presence of gas [11].
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The emission of gas in the mine was a controversial issue during
the hearing into the Bulli disaster. The evidence tendered by miners who
worked continually in gaseous sections of the mine was consistent with
nineteenth century geological expectations o f gas being encountered in
the Bulli seam [12], Yet, Department o f Mines officials and management
denied that unsafe quantities of gas were present at Bulli.

The

unexpected striking of several dykes was also a major contributing factor
in the explosion because of the associated emission of explosive firedamp
(methane).

The discharge of firedamp necessitated additional safety

procedures which were not observed at the Bulli mine by either
management,

miners,

or members

o f the Department of Mines

inspectorate.
The colliery had increased output annually until 1884 when a
large dyke o f basalt was struck 1200 metres along the main tunnel from
the entrance. Because the basalt caused cindering and isolation from the
coal seam in a northwesterly direction along the main tunnel, another
tunnel was struck off to the west to avoid the unprofitable mining of
stone.

The new section became known as the 'Western district'. New

leases were obtained under government land.

However, in these new

leases along the direction o f the main tunnel the dyke was struck again.
With the objective of avoiding the dyke, two parallel tunnels known as
'headings 1’ and ’2’ were driven at right angles in a northeasterly direction
to the main tunnel. This section was known as the 'Hill End' or the 'gassy'
district. As this colloquial name suggests, these and the four subsequent
headings

gave

o ff volatile firedamp,

an

occurrence which

both

Governm ent and company witnesses attempted to deny during the course
of the inquest and the Royal Commission.
A contributory factor to the explosion was the inability of the
mine's inadequate ventilation system to disperse accumulations of gas.
Alexander Ross, the manager of the Bulli mine, James Rowan, the
Departm ent of Mines inspector and John Mackenzie the head of the
Coalfields Branch o f the Department, had neglected to provide adequate
ventilation according to law. Nevertheless, these men remained adamant
throughout the Commission's sittings that they had indeed observed all
the safety regulations.

The judgem ent delivered by the Commission
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exonerated these men and attributed the cause of the explosion to a
reckless miner who had perished in the explosion.
The propensity for health and safety issues to be overlooked in
N.S.W. coalmining had its roots in the economics o f mining and was not
necessarily the fault of individual company officials or government
inspectors. Owing to the intermittent nature of the coal trade during the
nineteenth century, mineworkers, especially those who were paid by
piece-work - that is, those who were not paid wages but paid by the
amount of coal they produced, had to take risks to maintain their
livelihood. From the time of the first effective competition against the
Australian Agricultural Company's coalmining monopoly in the early
1840s to the tim e o f writing, the N.S.W. coal industry has possessed the
potential to produce m ore coal than could be absorbed by its markets.
This potential gave rise to an almost continuous problem of under
employment in the industry until the outbreak of W orld W ar II, as well as
the inherent tendency in the industry to over produce [13]. From the end
of the AACo's monopoly in 1847 N.S.W. coalmine proprietors operated
their mines free of governmental regulation in the area o f workers'
compensation until 1900.

There were no laws in wage determination

until 1901 and pricing until 1916. Even by 1900 the only governmental
constraints

on

coalmine

proprietors

consisted

of

four

relatively

unsubstantial coalmining acts. It can be seen in Chapter One above that
these acts were carefijlly framed so as not to interfere with the
profitability

o f coalmining.

Employers' obligations

to

workers'

compensation were limited to the flimsy Employers' Liability Acts
enacted from 1882 and the Miners' Accident R elief Act of 1900, the first
act specifically concerned with compensation.

Consequently, wage

justice, work conditions and health and safety issues received little or no
consideration.
This laissez-faire attitude of the N.S.W. Governments during the
nineteenth century allowed the unfettered development of an industry
with too many mines and too many men which together constituted the
roots of excess capacity.

Because sailing ships were the mainstay of

transport for most of the nineteenth century, over-production caused by
climatic conditions exacerbated the problems of the industry. Stockpiles
and underemployment were a normal condition of the N.S.W. coalmining
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industry. These conditions placed inordinate pressures on all those
direcdy concerned with the production of coal to neglect safety factors.
This background of irregular employment also gave rise to a
pragmatic type o f unionism which was almost entirely occupied with
'bread and butter' issues arising out of necessity. This focus generally
precluded any organised action over the miners' health and safety.
Indeed, the individualistic nature o f the piece-work system nurtured by
the unions o f the day, fostered a disregard toward health and safety [14],
By the early 1860s when the Illawarra (Southern) district was established,
these attitudes were well rooted in the Newcastle district.

W ith the

expansion of the coal mining industry these traditions were transported to
the Southern district.
Apart

from

market

fluctuations

and

price

cutting,

the

inefficiency of the Colony’s transport system was the over-riding
contributor to the tendency for the industry to over produce. Newcastle
harbour was a dangerous, inaccessible port, Wollongong's harbour was
too small and the Bulli Coal Mining Company's jetty was frequently
washed away by big swells. Because W ollongong and Bulli were mainly
serviced by sail ships during the nineteenth century their harbours were
often inaccessible especially during heavy winds and adverse tides [15].
The irregular arrivals of ships was as unwelcome to the miners
as it was to coalmine proprietors.

W hen there were no ships in the

harbour the stockpiling of coal caused the deterioration of some qualities
of coal mainly due to spontaneous combustion. Stockpiling also required
double handling which increased the likelihood of breaking up the coal
trade preferred 'round' coal which passed over screens with bars 3/4" to
7/8" (approximately 19 to 22 millimetres) apart. In addition the process
incurred extra handling costs. To the miners the irregularity of shipping
meant an indeterminate number of days of long hours followed by an
equally uncertain period of idleness [16].

Hewers, the miners who

actually m ined the coal, and wheelers, who pushed the skips to and from
the 'coalface' to the haulage system were generally paid by result. 'Off
hand' workers, labourers who were paid by the day, were stood down
when coal was not required.
Consequendy, the customs and practices developed in the
coalmining industry were largely based on minimising the effects of
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intermittency and optimising their income.

These practices originally

dated from the 1840s in the Northern district where individual 'lodges'
were formed and a district union was created for a short period in 1854
and almost permanently from 1861 . However, the development of
unionism in the Southern district was slower. Coal was discovered in the
Illawarra in 1797 at Coalcliff, but not mined commercially until 1849
owing to the AACo's monopoly. From 1849 there was little expansion in
the Southern district until the 1880s. The number of mines grew from 5
in 1883 to 10 in 1885 in response to price increases during the prosperous
1880s. After the slump o f the 1890s these prices were not surpassed until
after World W ar I.

By the turn of the century, of the 100 mines in

N.S.W., 15 were located in the Illawarra, 64 in the Northern district and
the remainder in the W estern district [17].
W hile there is evidence of lodges at individual mines in the
1860s, attempts at district unionism in the Illawarra were unsuccessful
and after a union was established it was severely decimated by the
employers. In 1861 the recently reformed Northern union conducted a
strike and sent delegates [18] to the Illawarra to form a district union;
however these delegates were rebuffed by the Southern miners. It is not
clear to what extent the advances of the Northern unionists were resisted
by the Illawarra miners at the behest of coalmine owners [19]. However,
there is a significant body o f evidence which suggests that the miners
from then until 1879 rejected incorporation into a district association with
inter-district connections. This occurred because of the extra money they
earned when the Northern district was on strike which forced ships to call
at Illawarra ports.

After the IMMPA was formed as a result of a

successful delegation from the North in 1879, Illawarra miners continued
to capitalise on the industrial misfortunes of other districts despite
binding, or at times, less formal arrangements not to do so.
As mentioned above, Bulli harbour and the district's other
harbours were unprotected from heavy north-easterly swells; their jetties
were too insubstantial for big tides and were prone to wash away during
storms. Southern miners' earnings, like their Northern counterparts' were
heavily dependent on favourable shipping conditions.

After the rail

connection between W ollongong and Sydney was established in 1888
there was a slight improvement in transport efficiency but an endemic
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shortage o f rolling stock prevailed, especially during wheat harvests and
other peak periods in the rural sector.

Moreover, railway freight rates

were considered prohibitive by the coalmine owners who also owned
colliers (ships especially constructed to transport coal).

Therefore, sea

transport remained dominant well into the twentieth century.

Any

improvem ent in transport was also offset by the effects of the potential of
the industry to over produce.
As well as irregular income, Southern district miners were also
subjected to a reduction in wages from the late 1870s until the end of the
century.

In the Illawarra district hewing rates were almost never

determined on a sliding scale. However, owing to the contraction of the
price of coal from 12/- per ton in 1876 to 4/9d. in 1898, the coalmine
owners forced down the district hewing rate from 2/9d. in 1878 to 21- in
1894. This rate continued to 1899 when it rose to 2/2d. after the 1890s
depression [20],

In addition, the workforce, despite severe periods of

interm ittent employment, increased prodigiously from 528 in 1876 to
2352 in 1900.

The swelling of the workforce beyond the demand for

labour was the owners' stock-in-trade response of assuring that a large
army of reserve labour was available for long hours whenever ships
called. These pressures on the earning capacity of miners resulted in an
intensification of the labour process as well as an increase in the amount
of labour performed [21], Under these circumstances safety and health
were

of

little

consequence

to

the

IMMPA

and

its

successors.

Furthermore, the union was often preoccupied with ensuring its viability.
After being squeezed out of existence during the prolonged lock-out
lasting from September 1886 to just prior to the Bulli disaster in March
1887, the IMMPA was reformed in 1888 [22], In 1890, in an attempt to
improve its increasingly weakening condition, IMMPA became a branch
of the miners' organization, the A.M.A. [23] which operated in districts
where minerals other than coal were mined.
The method under which coal was mined and wages were earned
during the nineteenth century encouraged the non-observance of safety
procedures. Arguably, piece-work, which was the customary method of
payment in the United Kingdom where most N.S.W. coalminers came
from, flourished because it suited employers owing to the irregularity of
trade.

Piece-work also encouraged unsafe working.
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'contract' [24] system ensured that hewers worked almost unsupervised
[25]. They alone were responsible for the upkeep o f their 'place' in the
mine, a location known as the 'bord'. Under the 'bord and pillar' method,
single or parallel 'headings' normally four yards wide, were driven off the
main tunnels.

Headings, like tunnels, were simultaneously haulage

roadways and the means of ventilating the bords. Typically, bords four to
six yards wide were driven o ff headings, ideally at right angles to each
side of the heading. Sometimes bords were worked to adjoining parallel
headings leaving, when possible, symmetrical blocks of coal or 'pillars'
standing to support the 'roof. Until the 1950s it was more usual to let
pillars stand but when they were worked miners systematically cut
sections of pillars away until these were scarcely able to support the roof
which would collapse when 'props' (supporting timber) were withdrawn.
Although there were many variations of bord and pillar, as well
as the seldom used longwall system, all shared a basic similarity in the
way the coal was separated from the 'solid' (or coalface). The face was
initially undercut or holed generally at floor level, but if there was a band
of stone or dirt in the face the face was cut near or in the band to separate
it from the coal. The undercutting of the face was a skilful, arduous and
dangerous task. Ideally, with a floorcut, the 'kerf (or the undercut) was
made higher at the face, perhaps 18" to 24", and was tapered to the floor
perhaps 6 feet or more under the face as the kerf progressed. The wedged
shape o f the kerf facilitated the easier removal of the 'solid' (the undercut
coal) after the solid was drilled, charged with explosives and detonated.
As miners paid for their gunpowder and fuses they were fortunate if the
solid fell away unassisted.

Hewers were often forced into contorted

positions to undercut the coal by squatting or bending down. In a low
seam where they could not swing their picks vertically they lay on their
sides sometimes for hours at a time and often in water with the back of
Uieir shovel the only support for tiieir head. There was always a danger
when a hewer was right under die solid that it might give way dumping
several tons of coal on him, particularly if he had not 'spragged' the coal
by supporting it with short props positioned in the kerf.
measure was frequently not observed.

This safety

Because hewers were paid by

result safety procedures were often disregarded; any hold-up in the work
process interfered with their earning capacity. This may appe;tr a gross
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disregard o f the safety of others by individuals, but owing to the
intermittent nature of the N.S.W. coal trade these and other malpractices
were tolerated, and in fact, became an indispensable part of the economic
survival o f both miners and coalmine owners.
Each pair o f miners undercut and sometimes sheared [26] the
coal, drilled and shot the coal down and also filled the coal into skips. In
addition, they laid the skip rails as the face advanced, set the timber and
performed many other tasks. Aside from a cursory inspection by a deputy
(a company's safety and production officer) perhaps once or twice a day
when two shifts were worked, the hewers worked entirely unsupervised.
This was one feature which attracted the owners to use piece-work,
particularly in larger mines where there were more than a hundred bords,
the furthest literally miles from the adit (the mine's main entrance/exit).
However, this customary lack of supervision allowed miners a great deal
o f latitude in their work practices. Consequently, whenever possible they
cut comers, despite the fact that unsafe practices placed themselves and
their workmates at risk. Unsafe practices ranged from not spragging the
solid while lying under it, to not setting enough props so that the roof
m ight collapse without warning.

Such practices also consisted of the

careless use of explosives and safety lights which ultimately led to the
explosion at Bulli.
This attitude to health and safety by miners and their union is not
surprising.

To a degree their attitude reflected nineteenth century

indifference to work conditions.

M iners were used to working in

dangerous conditions and taking risks.

Among N.S.W. coalminers the

tradition o f playing down health and safety hazards came with the
introduction of the first free miners in N.S.W. who were not convicts.
British m iners brought with them a long history of placing economic
well-being before personal health and safety. A succession of immigrant
coalminers from England, Scotland and Wales also brought with them in
their 'invisible luggage', the results o f being subjected to long hours
underground, being surrounded by danger and atrocious working
conditions.

This invisible luggage turned out to be one of the main

contributing factors in the Bulli disaster of 1887.
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CHAPTER THREE
3 The Inquest
According to law the cause of the explosion at the Bulli Mine
had to be investigated by a coroner's inquest [1], However, the inquest
seemed to be earmarked for special attention by the Government from its
inception. Perhaps anticipating local antagonism in the Bulli district, a
solicitor had been instructed by the Crown Solicitor to represent the
interests of the Crown, the Government and the Department of Mines [2].
Adverse press reports criticising the Government and officers of the
Department of Mines m ust have placed considerable pressure on the
Government. The tone o f the following newspaper article was typical of
the criticism levelled at the Government:
(h)ow is it that a colliery explodes within a week o f its being
examined and pronounced safe by a Government officer?' [3].
The engaging of solicitors by the Department of Mines, the Bulli
Coal Mining Company and the Illawarra Miners' Mutual Protective
Association was a tacit admission that litigation by the three represented
parties could be expected.

The Daily Telegraph, commenting on the

inimical atmosphere during the inquest, noted:
(s)ides were taken at its inauguration, and the distinction
between defence and prosecution was as clear as noonday. The
Bulli Coal Company were on their |>ic] trial and with them their
manager and overman, the Examiner of Coalfields and the
District Inspector. They must have all felt that; indeed, they
often showed that they did, the asseverations of the counsel that
it was not a trial notwithstanding.
The Illawarra Miners'
Association, but more particularly the more prominent remaining
members of the Bulli Lodge of that association were the
prosecutors [4].
The established procedure used by the Government was to send
the

Department of M ines

inspector,

Mr James

Rowan,

as

its

representative at coronial inquests in the Illawarra District. At the Bulli
inquest however, in addition to a solicitor, the Government had taken the
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unprecedented step of requisitioning a Sydney magistrate, M r George
O'Malley Clarke from the Department of Justice, to assist the Coroner [5],
The District Magistrate and Coroner, Mr J. F. Smith, was considered
incapable of sitting on this case alone [6], Owing to the serious nature of
this

inquest,

the

Government's

action

appeared

to

be justified.

Considering that Smith, a local businessman, had been appointed to the
Bench not as the result of any legal expertise, but simply as the result of
custom because he was a middle-class community leader, this was a
sound decision.

Furthermore, besides his coronial income, Smith had

depended on the community for the better part of his livelihood in his
capacity as land agent and auctioneer. The fraternal interactions between
Smith and the miners during the inquest indicate that the Government's
cause would have been better served without his presence. Statute law,
however, prevented his total removal from the case [7]-

Clarke's

participation ensured Smith's co-operation to the extent that he was
overawed by Clarke’s presence. The D aily Telegraph reported:
(t)hat gentleman, with a proper conception of his duties sat
passively beside the Coroner, and throughout the whole
investigation never infringed the dignity of the Court by any
suggestion, advice to, or question through the Coroner; these
were conveyed sotto voce . Hence there was the spectacle of an
austere and dignified well known and able Sydney stipendiary
magistrate sitting very close to an unobtrusive coroner,
prompting more than two-thirds o f the questions in a skilled and
studied undertone [8],
Having served as Assisting Coroner, Clarke was also chosen as a
Commissioner on the Royal Commission.

The double appointment of

Clarke m ust have been a unique judicial innovation. To serve twice as an
adjudicator on the same matter appears contrary to any other N.S.W. legal
precedent.
Newspaper articles suggested that the inquest jury was top-heavy
with relatives who had lost their lives in the explosion. Furthermore, it
was alleged that three jurors had worked in the Bulli mine until the strike
and were not re-engaged when work resumed at the mine [9]. The verdict
of the jury seems to reflect that the newspaper allegations were factual.
One of the jurors, Joseph Walker, a farmer, had lost a brother and two
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nephews in the explosion. W alker and the three miners who were not re
engaged by the company could hardly have been expected to return an
unbiased verdict.
The principal object of Clarke's and the solicitor's appointment
was a Government m anoeuvre designed to minimise the prejudice of the
inquest jury. However, this proved to be an impossible task. By law,
jurors had to be chosen from eligible residents within the Bulli Jurors
District [10].
process.

Governm ent interference could not alter that selection

The Governm ent solicitor was entitled to reject jurors who

m ight be prejudiced and select those who might not be so prejudiced, or
those who may have even been favourably inclined towards the
Government. However, during the empanelling of the initial inquest jury
on the day after the explosion, it became evident that most jurors had a
relative or friend killed in the explosion. The jury rejection rate by the
Crown solicitor climbed as more bodies were brought out o f the mine
with the result that three entire juries were determined to be unsuitable
and thus were disengaged.

The district soon ran out of eligible jurors

[ 11].
An acceptable jury was finally constituted. This panel consisted
of five farmers, four publicans, a landlord, a butcher and a storekeeperminer [12].

The Daily Telegraph

alleged after the verdict had been

received that:
(t)he num ber of disinterested jurors is doubtful. W ith all respect,
they m ust upon reflection see that they were biassed by their
previously and pre-maturely-formed convictions [13].
The Daily Telegraph's allegation seems well founded; the publicans,
butcher, storekeeper and landlord would have been dependent largely on
miners' patronage. Joseph W alker, the farmer who had lost three relatives
no doubt would have been biased against the Department of Mines and
the Bulli Coal Mining Company. W hile the disposition of the remaining
four farmers could not be reliably determined, it seems likely that they
may well have shared some o f the bitterness of the local community.
According to the Daily

Telegraph, only one juror had friendly

inclinations toward the government and the company for reasons of
personal gain - he had a timber contract with the company [14].
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Notwithstanding

governmental

interference,

the

verdict

implicated the Department of Mines and the Bulli Coal Mining Company.
After being asked by the Coroner if the jury had reached their verdict the
foreman replied:
(y)es, the Jury are of the opinion that William W ade and others
came to their death in the Bulli Coalmine on the 23rd of March
1887 by a gas explosion (and added as a rider) which was
brought about by the disregard of the Bulli Colliery Special
Rules and the Coal Mines Regulation Act, in allowing men to
work when gas existed [ 151.
This was an unknown verdict for coal mining communities accustomed to
the fatal nature of working underground.

In inquests where the

empanelling of juries was a legal requirement, invariably such juries
relum ed a verdict of accidental death. In the case of the Bulli jury owing
to the immensity o f the disaster and residual resentment over the
company's role in the 1886-87 strike the trite verdict of accidental death
was rejected. Instead, the jury openly blamed both the company and the
Departm ent o f M ines for the disaster.

Implicit in the verdict was that

company m anagem ent and Department of Mines officials had allowed
miners to work in the presence of gas.

The jury's reference to the

disregard o f the Bulli Colliery Special Rules could have implicated the
miners, the Department of Mines, the company, or all three.

The

treatment o f Government and company witnesses by the jury and the
miners' solicitor left no doubt in the minds of people in the Department of
Mines and the company as to whom the verdict was directed [16]. That
the jury was earnest in its desire to incriminate the company and the
Departm ent of M ines is evident in the admissions of several jurors after
the inquest. It was revealed that they had wanted to return a verdict of
wilful neglect against the company and the Department.

They had

assumed however, that the appended rider in which they had conveyed
that intention was as legally valid as the verdict itself [17].
The jury had been particularly critical of John Mackenzie, the
Departm ent of M ines' examiner of coalfields.

The presence of Mr D.

Rees, the Chairman, M r W. Hunter, the Treasurer and M r J. Curley, the
General Secretary of the Coal M iners' Mutual Protective Association of
the Hunter River District, seemed to encourage the already vindictive
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mood of the jury to harass M ackenzie and to a lesser extent James
Rowan, the Department o f Mines inspector for the Illawarra and Western
districts [18]. Utilising the right of cross-examination by the foreman, the
jury continuously assailed the opinions of both Government and company
witnesses, especially testing the evidence given by M ackenzie and
Rowan. Examiner Mackenzie, in particular, was frequently subjected to
humiliating cross-examination by the jury and as a result he was criticised
in the national press. In contrast, however, witnesses who gave evidence
on behalf of the m iners were treated with respect and cordiality by the
jury [19]. Notwithstanding the jury's partisanship, their criticism o f the
Department of Mines was warranted.
The Governm ent had been frequently criticised in Parliament
and in the press over the negligence exhibited by officers of the
Department of M ines.

In 1886, in response to the Lithgow Valley

Colliery Royal Commission, Mr. DeCourcy Browne, M ember for
Mudgee, cited the proprietors of the Lithgow Colliery, Mackenzie and
Rowan as negligent and directly responsible for an accident at the
Lithgow mine [20]. An article appearing in the Sydney Mail, anticipating
that a Royal Commission into the Bulli disaster would be held, reported
that:
(t)he m atters of the recent coronial inquest and promised Royal
Commission are the all-absorbing topics of public interest
hereabouts. The late jury individually contend that their verdict
was m ost intelligible and proper - press comments
notwithstanding. It is maintained that the act clearly provides
for the men to be removed from workings where gas exists, until
sufficient protection be supplied; and this was not observed at
the Bulli pit, according to the evidence [21].
The Government had been incriminated and reacted accordingly
at two levels. W ith parliamentary powers at the Government's disposal, a
Royal Commission was proposed and assented to by the Parliament.
Many of the Members of Parliament had a vested interest in maintaining
the strength and economic viability of the coalmining industry.

At a

departmental level, a smear campaign was launched against the Bulli
miners by examiner M ackenzie [22] during the inquest. This campaign
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continued throughout the inquest and was maintained after the winding up
of the Bulli Royal Commission.
The selection of jurors and other statutory prerequisites that
applied to other types of inquests did not apply to the formation o f Royal
Commissions. The prejudice of the Bulli community could be overcome
with the establishm ent of the Commission. The Cabinet, armed with the
consent of a sympathetic Parliament, had the constitutional right to
choose Commissioners and to select terms of reference, was able to
reverse the verdict of the inquest by creating a puppet Royal Commission.
Traditionally, Royal Commissions are constitutionally appointed by
parliam ent which comprises the Crown, the Legislative Council and the
Legislative Assembly. In practice members are chosen by the Minister
responsible in conjunction with Cabinet [23],
From an official perspective, the Royal Commission was
appointed to undertake a diligent and extensive inquiry into the cause of
the explosion. It was further exhorted to ascertain the person or persons
responsible and to make recommendations affecting the management and
ventilation of the mine.

Amendments to the 1876 CMRA which were

concerned with the prevention of further gas explosions were due to be
made [24]. A cursory review of the activities o f the Commission seemed
to suggest that it performed its appointed duties. In reality, manipulation
by the Government subverted its objective mission.

The Commission

made recommendations regarding management and ventilation and
suggested amendments to the 1876 CMRA. However, recommendations
for im proved m ine management were ignored. Mr. Alexander Ross, the
manager o f the Bulli Mine continued as manager after the explosion and
the old ventilation system in place at the time of the disaster remained.
The suggestions m ade in order to improve the CMRA were ignored by
Parliam ent for two years when the new CMRA was moved, only to be
repressed until 1896 when it was enacted [25], By 1890 [26], the use of
naked safety lights was universally adopted at the Bulli mine despite the
fact that it had been an open safety lamp that had caused the explosion.
Considering the immensity of the loss of life at Bulli and the potential for
further disaster these were scarcely reactions calculated to make N.S.W.
coalmines safer workplaces.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4 The Composition of the Royal Commission
The conduct of a Royal Commission depends upon the quality
and character of the Commissioner (Australian Law Journal,
(29): 268).
From the time it became apparent that the inquest was going to
be followed by a Royal Commission, the composition of the Commission
was debated in Parliament and in the press [1]. The Bulli correspondent
for the Sydney M ail expressed the widespread fear o f the community that
a Royal Commission was to be established, the findings of which would
be predetermined. The article stated that:
(t)he matters of the recent coronial inquest and promised Royal
Commission are the all-absorbing topics o f public interest
hereabouts. The late jury individually contend that their verdict
was m ost intelligible and proper - press comments
notwithstanding. It is maintained that the Act clearly provides
for the m en to be rem oved from workings where gas exists, until
sufficient protection be supplied and this was not observed at the
Bulli Pit, according to the evidence. The mining community
express little confidence in the action of a Royal Commission
unless m iners are represented thereon, as, it is urged, the
sympathies o f colonial experts are entirely with the proprietors;
in fact, that such familiarity exists between the former and the
latter that impartiality is next to impossible. Great stress is laid
on the fact that officials, experts and managers, all fraternised
during the recent inquest and the Bulli company's steamer
conveyed those engaged on the inquest during its progress [2],
Initially all appointees to the Commission were selected from the
non-mining community [3].

The Government, in part due to adverse

press and pressure from Parliament, relented to this pressure and included
three miners as members of the Commission to make it appear more
representative o f all interest groups. However, an analysis of these three
miners' educational qualifications suggests that none possessed a level of
theoretical mining knowledge equal to the demands of underground
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safety requirements.

Furthermore, two of them seemed to be more

favourably inclined towards their employer than to their fellow workmen.
The Government's final choice of Commissioners were as
follows: Chairman, Dr. James R. M. Robertson, mining engineer, and
Director o f several coal mining companies; M r John Young Neilson,
m anager o f the W allsend Colliery; M r Thomas Croudace, manager of the
Lambton Colliery; M r Joseph Hilton, checkweighman at the Mount Keira
Colliery; M r John Jones, checkweighman at the Lambton Colliery; Mr
John Owens, Secretary of the Coal M iners' Mutual Protective Association
of the W estern district at Lithgow and M r George O'Malley Clarke,
Stipendiary Magistrate. While it is true that m ost of the Commission's
members had either practical or theoretical mining expertise, of its seven
members six had little empathy with miners, being more favourably
disposed towards management. G. O. Clarke possessed no knowledge of
the industry whatsoever and perhaps he was suitably chastened by the
adverse press reaction regarding his participation in the inquest and the
Commission:

W hatever the reason, Clarke's contribution to the

Commission was negligible and he asked less than ten per cent of the
total questions put to witnesses [4], m ost of which were asked in the
absence of Robertson when Clarke had taken the Chair.
Dissatisfaction with the composition of the Commission was
soon expressed by the Members for Northumberland, a three member
electorate composed predominantly o f miners. In contrast, the ever silent
M.L.A. for Illawarra, M r Francis W oodward, did not oppose a Royal
Commission, the membership of which reflected the interests of
management. In fact, M r Woodward did not speak on the Bulli disaster at
all during the session o f Parliament at the time of the disaster - neither did
he ask any questions about the event [5]. It seemed that Woodward was
not an active representative of his constituents; of all the 74 divisions of
the House during the first session of the new Parliament, Woodward
participated only in 25.

His contribution to Committees can also be

questioned as he attended only 24 out o f a possible 76 sittings [6].
Notwithstanding his lack of vigour in parliamentary affairs, W oodward
was re-elected in 1889 and served for a further two years.
It was Thomas Walker, one of the three members for
Northumberland, who became one of the leaders of the miners' cause

34

Bulli mining disaster 1887

against the bias inherent in the Commission. M r W alker had a twofold
motivation for acting in this way. He wanted to satisfy the miners' lobby
in his electorate [7] and to air his Protectionist dislike of Parkes' 'freetrade' Ministry. W alker em erged in Parliament as a trouble m aker over
the issue o f the bias o f four Commissioners and the submissiveness of the
other three to the former. Despite his ulterior motives, W alker's criticism
of the Governm ent was justified, particularly as he endorsed one of his
constituents' letters in Parliament which objected to the final selection of
the membership of the Bulli Royal Commission:
It is [sic] reasonable to expect anything but a farce when such
men as Dr. Robertson and J. Y. Neilson are appointed on the
commission? The latter does not conduct the ventilation of his
own colliery according to the present act ... . This appointment
has caused intense dissatisfaction throughout this district [8[.
This anonymous criticism was justified.

Neilson, the manager of the

W allsend mine, had contravened the CMRA on several occasions. Even
the Department of M ines itself had been engaged in a dispute with
Neilson regarding his repeated failure to observe the CMRA [9], It seems
that Jones, Hilton and Owens were chosen as Commissioners to make the
process appear to be representative of all interest groups, thereby
counteracting criticism against the Commission such as those delivered
by Walker. Another reason for the selection of Jones, Hilton and Owens
was to exclude troublemakers such as the Newcastle Coal Miners' Mutual
Protective Association's vociferous Secretary, Mr James Curley [10].
Curley, who had been instrumental in arousing high sentiment among
miners over the Bulli disaster, was no doubt responsible for the majority
of the Northumberland members' reaction to the disaster in Parliament
[11]. Jones, Hilton and Owens served well the interests of managers and
proprietors as predicted by Thomas W alker who saw that:
(t)he composition of this body clearly indicated that the interests
of the miners would not be considered. The very fact that the
commission was composed of Dr. Robertson, Mr. Neilson and
Mr. Croudace on the one hand; and Messrs. Owen, Jones and
Holden [«'c] on the other, with Mr. OM alley Clarke as
chairman, showed that if any interests were to be considered at
all they would be those of the managers and proprietors [12],

35

Bulli mining disaster 1887

The Illawarra Mercury also held an opinion which reflected a concern
over the choice o f Commissioners, in particular, the choice of Dr.
Robertson. Robertson was later reputed to be able to get managers to do
whatever he wanted [13]. Jones had served with Robertson and Neilson
on the Fem dale Colliery Royal Commission in 1886 and he knew how to
maintain the role expected of working class people co-opted on official
inquiries. If Jones forgot something, his manager at the Lambton Colliery
as a fellow Commissioner could prom pt him.
Croudace, like Neilson, had contravened the CMRA several
times.

One contravention had taken place as recently as 1886.

The

ventilation in the Lambton Colliery was so defective that powdersmoke
from explosives was visible for the entire time of an unexpected visit by
an inspector of the Department of M ines. Croudace's expertise must be
considered as suspect. Under his m anagem ent one of the pit tunnels at
Lambton had been excavated so close to the surface that the main
Northern Road, near Tighes Hill had subsided [14],

It was examiner

M ackenzie who had performed the survey for the tunnel. Yet Croudace,
like M ackenzie and Neilson, was touted by the Department of Mines as
well as the Government as one of the m ost knowledgeable experts on
mining in the Colony [15].
Objections concerning the appointment of Croudace to the Royal
Commission came from the Northern district and were numerous and
frequently placed before Parliament by W alker and Mr Ninian Melville,
another of the Northumberland members. A special objection was made
to Croudace's treatment of his miners and his patronising attitude towards
them.

Croudace had been engaged in a minor pay dispute which

developed into a seven month lock-out. His amicable relationship with
Jones, who had been a checkweighman for 25 years [16], casts suspicion
on Jones' self-interest.

The precarious tenure of a checkweighman's

occupation requires explanation as it reflects directly on Jones' social and
economic aspirations. Under the CMRA, miners were entitled to appoint
a checkweighman [17] whose duty was to weigh at random a skip of coal
as being average in content.

The miners' piece-rates were calculated

according to this process. However, mine managers employed company
checkweighmen who were likely to choose a skip with less coal as the
average weight. If the miners' representative chose a fuller skip as the
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average, the checkweighmen was liable to be dismissed and fined under
an abuse o f Section 20 o f the CMRA which stated that:
(t)he checkweigher shall not be authorised in any way to impede
or interrupt the working of the mine or to interfere with the
weighing . . . . If a checkweigher shall impede or interrupt the
working o f the mine or interfere with the weighing or otherwise
m is-conduct him self such owner or agent may complain to the
nearest Court of Petty Session .... [18]
Jones had fulfilled the duties o f a checkweighman for 25 years without
any problems [19] which suggests that he was a tool of m anagement as
there had been several prosecutions of other checkweighmen [20],
Hilton, like Jones, was also a checkweighman who had similar
aspirations. Hilton was politically active in the Illawarra electorate and
had nominated Francis Woodward's opponent, Mr Andrew Lysacht, prior
to W oodward's election [21]. The Bulli and Clifton Times and Illawarra
M iners' Advocate, pandering to its predominantly miner based readership,
deplored Hilton’s political attitude and ambition. An article in a February,
1887 issue stated that:
... Mr. H. whose interesting twaddle about those monthly old
'principles re protection and toryism had no effect upon the
intelligence of the Illawarra miners, particularly those of Bulli
and Coalcliff [22].
Hilton's proclivity towards achieving upward social mobility may well
have affected his judgement during the investigation into the Bulli
tragedy.
Neilson, like Croudace, had very poor working relations with his
men. Since 1861, he had often battled the m iners'union [23], Unionism
in the Northern district had been organised since 1860 [24], unlike the
Southern coalfields where a permanent coalmining union was not
organised until 1879 [25], In 1861, Northern districts owners decided it
was in their best interests to create a united front and tackle this
unwelcome combination of miners head-on.
willing participant in this confrontation.

Neilson was a more than

Moreover, an owners' mutual

protective organisation was formed which standardised piece-work rates,
wages and hours which existed under various shapes and forms
throughout the nineteenth century [26].
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short-lived, but it was a forerunner of several organisations which
combined to combat miners’ demands, generally for wage justice. The
owners' aversion to spending money on equipment has previously been
discussed. However, when it came to wage increases their antipathy was
especially strong as it inevitably drew class antagonism into the equation.
Neilson typified this disposition and his attitude toward workers was
captured in a letter he wrote in 1888 to Mr. F. W. Binney, the Secretary of
the then M asters' Association.

In the letter he wrote about the strike

breaking techniques he had employed and encouraged Binney to employ
similar techniques.

Clearly, Neilson was advocating an assault on

workers; he referred to miners as the enemy and gave instructions on how
to defeat them [27]. Neilson could not have been a man kindly disposed
towards the Bulli miners - undoubtedly he favoured the interests of the
Departm ent of Mines and the Bulli Coal Mining Company.

Another

factor which m ust have affected Neilson's judgem ent was his employment
by the company at the time of the explosion. He had been engaged by the
company to measure the royalties owed to the Government from its
Crown leases [28], Neilson also had a close association with Alexander
Ross, the m anager o f the Bulli mine.

Yet, he was required to pass

judgem ent on him. Indeed, on the day of the explosion the two men had
attended the W ollongong flower show together. Neilson, nevertheless,
denied his connection with the company when confronted with the
accusations of his bias in the matter [29].
Ninian Melville, M.L.A. for Northumberland, like Walker, was
against Neilson's inclusion on the Commission.

He felt that Neilson's

judgem ent could be impaired as a result of his employment by the
company.

M elville's principal objection to Neilson's appointment was

that Neilson had already testified as a witness at the inquest [30], and
protested:
... that it was contrary to all ideas of British justice to first of all
take a man's evidence on a question and then appoint him a
judge to give determination upon it [31],
Melville, a Protectionist and liberal, to whom Sir Henry Parkes referred to
as the 'veriest charlatan that ever lived' [32], was sympathetic to the
miners' cause. M aking the most of the Government's bad publicity over
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its handling of the Bulli affair, Melville continued to harass the Parkes
M inistry over its choice of Commissioners.

In support of Walker,

M elville also questioned Croudace’s appointment [33] and disapproved of
Dr. Robertson's appointm ent because he felt that his extensive financial
interests in the coalmining industry would impair his judgem ent [34],
The controversy over Robertson's appointment caused the
Government to m islead Parliam ent deliberately. Mr. Francis Abigail, the
Secretary for Mines, and therefore the responsible Minister, responded to
M elville's attack by stating th a t'... Dr. Robertson had no direct interest in
any mine ... ' [35].

Yet, Department o f Mines correspondence to the

Under-Secretary of Mines cites Robertson as 'directing manager' of
M ount Kembla Colliery [36],
immediate subordinate.

The Under-Secretary was Abigail's

In this case, either Abigail was unaware of

Robertson's role, or he deliberately misrepresented his department's
correspondence.
implicated

It would appear the latter case was true.

himself

after

M elville

insisted

that

Dr.

Abigail

Robertson's

correspondence was always written on the note paper of a 'certain
company'. To this, Abigail replied:
I submitted this very question to Dr. Robertson, and I have his
' clear statement that he is not interested to the extent of a farthing
in any mine in the colony [37].
Some doubt may be cast on Abigail's integrity, for in 1892 he was
convicted o f fraud as a result of his chairmanship of the Australian
Banking Company and sentenced to five years hard labour [38].
Contrary to Abigail's denial, Robertson's level o f involvement
was more than incidental. During the Mount Kembla Colliery Disaster
Royal Commission in 1902, Robertson appeared as a witness, and
revealed his close connection to the M ount Kembla Colliery which had
lasted for 20 years [39],

This association also attests to his close

affiliation with Ebenezer Vickery, the owner of the Mount Kembla
Colliery and a director of the Bulli Coal Mining Company at the time of
the explosion [40],

The legal firm established by the late Sir George

W igram Allen seems to be a common factor in several relationships on
the southern district coalfields in the late 1880s [41],
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The Government's denial over Robertson's involvement in the
coalmining industry was a futile exercise. It was common knowledge in
the Illaw arra district that Robertson was an active participant in the
Illawarra Collieries Proprietors' Defense Association. This association,
which included the Bulli Coal M ining Company as a member, had
utilised Robertson as a spokesman during the campaigns the company had
m ounted against the striking workers in the 1886-1887 strike/lock-out
[42],
Reactions in Parliament to the appointment of miners on the
Commission indicated the animosity som e parliamentarians held towards
workers in general.

Mr. See, later Sir John and Premier of N.S.W.

presumed:
(t)hat the object o f the minister in appointing the commission
w as to get at the truth as to the cause of the disaster in the Bulli
mine. If the minister had appointed men who had a prejudice
against the proprietors of the mine and a feeling in favour of the
unfortunate miners the ends of justice would not be met [43].
Mr. John McElhone, M.L.A., concurred with Mr. See questioning the
right o f m iners to nominate members o f the committee [44],

It is no

surprise that both See and McElhone were actively involved in the
coalmining industry.
The Government of the day could not claim that the Bulli Royal
Commission fairly represented all interests. Thomas W alker's prophetic
insights regarding the subservience o f the miners' representatives on the
Commission became fact. Jones, Hilton and Owens were overawed by
the presence of the representatives of management, and consequently,
their contributions to the Commission's judgem ent were insignificant
compared to those made by Robertson.

Out of 5963 questions asked,

Jones put 434; Hilton 308; Owens, 354; Neilson, 317; Clarke, 538;
Croudace, 1011; and Robertson, 2996 [45],
The motives driving Croudace are somewhat unclear. Possibly
his actions can be explained by his desire to surpass Robertson's
achievements because he had been engaged in a feud with Robertson
[46],

Croudace was certainly regarded as an elder statesman in the

mining community of the Northern district, an area where a locality was
named in his honour. Although he was financially connected to several
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Northern district mines, in 1887 Robertson did not have as high a public
profile in the Northern district as Croudace did. There also existed inter
district rivalry between the Southern and Western districts which were
both regarded as being substantially inferior to the north both in terms of
output and quality of the coal.

Neilson's lack of initiative might be

explained in terms of a feud with Mackenzie, the examiner of coalfields
[47],

Certainly Clarke's complete lack of knowledge of the mining

industry explains his lacklustre performance.
The choice of Robertson had been a deft move.

He skilfully

manipulated most o f the Commissioners and witnesses. In the light of
Neilson's and Croudace's contraventions of the CMRA and their
disposition against workers, the Government could not hold the position
that the Commission would be an impartial inquiry.
considering

Robertson's

financial

interests

together

Furthermore,
with

Clarke's

ignorance of mining procedures and Jones', Hilton's and Owen's
subservient roles, the Commission had little chance of doing justice to the
issues

at hand.

In

a

similar vein,

the

financial

interests

of

parliamentarians does not provide any indication that the Commission
was initiated out o f an altruistic desire to improve safety in the mining
industry through legislation.

If there had been a genuine desire to

eradicate reckless behaviour by miners and neglect by management and
Department of Mines officers, successive parliaments would not have
needed nine years to legislate the new Coal Mines Regulation Act.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5

The Bulli Royal Commission

... of the seven gentlemen constituting the Commission,
probably only two had a hand in its compilation ... (Illawarra
Mercury, 19 July, 1887).
To avoid the emotive atmosphere witnessed at the Bulli inquest,
Robertson

decided to hold

the

Bulli Royal Commission

at the

Wollongong Town Hall. Because W ollongong was not yet connected by
rail to Bulli and the journey by road was tortuous the difficulty of the 13
kilometre journey from Bulli to W ollongong precluded those miners who
were not witnesses attending the hearing. Although the Commission was
open, the strictly controlled mode of conduct was the opposite of the
informal atmosphere which had prevailed during the inquest. Robertson,
empowered by the Taking o f Evidence by Commissioners Act, tightly
controlled the entire procedure [1], He determined the type of'questions,
instructed his subordinate Commissioners on how to conduct an
examination of witnesses and chose the witnesses.

The Illawarra

Mercury commented that:
(t)he Bulli Commission began taking evidence at Wollongong
yesterday. The inquiry was conducted with open doors, but the
attendance was small owing, it is believed, to the strong feeling
at Bulli that the inquiry ought to have been held there. The
president, Dr. Robertson made a lengthy opening address to his
fellow commissioners in which he gave them advice as to the
manner in which they should act and conduct themselves. He
also addressed the press [2],
Given the choice of Commissioners, the selection of questions
and witnesses, the outcome of the Royal Commission was not entirely
unexpected. The judgem ent exonerated Mr. Alexander Ross, the manager
of the Bulli Colliery, M r James Rowan, the Department of Mines
inspector and M r J. Mackenzie, the examiner of coalfields. While the
Royal Commission reproached Mr. Richard White, the overman, and
some o f the deputies, it first and forem ost blamed miners for the
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explosion [3], The stance adopted by the Commissioners ignored the fact
that as with the vicarious responsibility associated with the position o f
captain o f a vessel at sea, under the CMRA, the ultimate responsibility for
all aspects of mining rested with mine management and the Department
of Mines [4], The Special Rules accorded to each m ine under the CMRA
gave the manager total control over all officers and made the manager
responsible for the safety o f m iners [5],

Ross often had flouted the

'Special Rules for the Bulli Colliery', especially those sections relating to
ventilation, safety lamps and gas. Furthermore, the CMRA provided for
the examiner and the inspector to ensure that all regulations were adhered
to by the mine managers.

Rowan and Mackenzie had not checked to

confirm if Ross had observed all provisions of the CMRA.
absolution,
Commission.

therefore,

depended

on

Ross's

exoneration

Their
by

the

The Commissioner's rationale seemed to have been to

establish Ross's innocence, thereby undermining the charges against him
that were implied as a result of the verdict delivered at the inquest.
Having exonerated Ross, the charge that Mackenzie and Rowan were
derelict in their duties would become redundant.
The Royal Commission's desire to exonerate Ross and officials
o f the Department of Mines was a goal which was supported by other
managers in the Illawarra district.

More than likely, they wanted to

establish Ross' competency as a means of reflecting the competency of
officials generally, thus protecting their own interests so that the Bulli
explosion was seen as an isolated unfortunate accident [6], It appeared
that they did not wish to implicate the Department of Mines, an action
which might attract heavy measures of retribution by inspections
sometime in the future [7],

In contrast to the observations made by

managers and the Commissioners, the testimony records that the real
cause of the explosion was linked to negligence by both colliery
m anagement and the Department of Mines.

Flagrant disregard of the

CMRA by Ross, M ackenzie and Rowan had created the conditions which
eventually led to the Bulli explosion.
The reasoned judgement of the Royal Commission was that the
disaster occurred because a m iner had used explosives carelessly. As far
as the Commission was concerned, the person or persons to blame for the
accident was either:
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W estwood, or his mate (both deceased) who at the moment were
working at the face of no. 2 heading and who prepared and fired
the shot, which in the opinion of the Commission was the
imm ediate or primary cause o f the explosion [8].
The indictment of W estwood and his m ate ignored the actual causes of
the explosion which included faulty ventilation, frequent contraventions
of the CM RA, and an almost complete absence of safety procedures in the
mine. O ne contributory factor was an oversight by Ross who neglected to
ensure that his instructions regarding the firing of shots were observed.
The firing of shots created the m ost likely condition under which an
explosion could take place [9], especially at Bulli where miners used
highly volatile coaldust as tamping material and opened their safety
lamps in a gas laden atmosphere to light the fuses. Ross had given the
overman Richard W hite instructions to allow only deputies to fire shots
due the dangerous nature o f the procedure. Yet, implausible as it seems,
Ross had not provided a deputy on the nightshift. This dereliction of duty
did not, however, convince the Royal Commission of any incompetence
on Ross' part in the disaster.

There was no provision under the 1876

CMRA for shotfiring procedure and m anagers were left to use their own
discretion. Ross' inattention to shot-firing was irresponsible, not illegal.
On this m atter the Royal Commission commented blandly that '(t)he
arrangem ent for firing shots ... was unusual and unsatisfactory' [10].
Ross also had given instructions not to fire shots in the presence
of gas, yet he had provided no means to remove such gas. He had not
furnished equipment to conduct the air current to the working face as
required by the CMRA.

Nevertheless, he was only guilty of a small

oversight, and according to the Royal Commission:
... the deputy Robert M illward [.v/c] deceased, Richard White,
overman, and to a less extent (except in the matter of providing
bratticing for which he was alone responsible) Alexander Ross,
manager, were guilty of contributory negligence [11].
This was one of the few instances in which Ross was reprimanded in the
Commission's lengthy summation.
There were several ventilation problems at the Bulli mine. One
o f the m ore serious was the use of a system which brought gas from one
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heading to other headings. Another problem was the failure to brattice up
to the face. The accumulation o f gas as a result of the ventilation system
introduced by Ross, and approved by Rowan and Mackenzie, did in all
probability cause the explosion.

The Royal Commission, however,

merely believed that 'it betrayed an absence of forethought' by Ross [12].
The air current at Bulli was drawn in at the adit and after being prevented
from entering several unused workings and tunnels by stoppings, or walls
made from worthless pit-stone, the air was divided into two main
portions. One portion supplied the Western district, the other the main
tunnel to the Hill End district where the explosion took place.
The dividing o f the air at the junction of these tunnels was
brought about by a door with a regulating shutter which directed the
am ount o f air that passed to each district. The air in the main tunnel was
then conducted through the No. 1 heading into the No. 2 heading via a
'cut-through'. According to the CMRA, as headings advanced they had to
be connected every 35 yards by cut-throughs or 'stentons' in order to
allow the air to circulate near the advancing face which was the most
likely location for gas [13]. To prevent air from escaping through old
stentons, these routes were sealed with stoppings as the headings
progressed.
After passing through No. 2 heading from No. 1, the air was then
circulated to headings 3, 4, 5 and 6, which were also driven off the main
tunnel. In order to prevent the air from going straight up the main tunnel,
a door was placed between Nos. 1 and 2 and each subsequent pair of
headings. Every heading had working places or 'bords' driven off them to
each side. As each bord was 'worked out' of coal it was also sealed off by
stoppings to prevent the air current circulating through. This cost-cutting
device, although not illegal, was another doubtful mining practice as
unused bords were precisely the locations where firedamp might
accumulate. As the ’working’ bords advanced, they too were supposed to
be connected with cut-throughs if their length exceeded 35 yards [14],
The short-comings o f the ventilation system used at Bulli were
numerous. W hen gas was encountered in the No. 1 heading and some of
its working bords, it was conducted into the No. 2 and successive heading
to be emitted by the 'furnace', an underground fire which expelled the air
by convection through a vertical shaft. The direction of the air current
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swept explosive firedamp into sections where men were working with
naked lights. The regulating door at the junction o f the main tunnel and
the W estern tunnel as well as the doors between the headings were
frequently opened, allowing for even a greater accumulation of gas.
The installation of a new furnace during the strike, which had
trebled the volume of air, had lulled Ross and the overman, White, into a
false sense o f security [15]. It appears that Ross and W hite had neither
the expertise nor cared to ensure whether or not the air supply reached the
critical destinations, the working faces in the headings and bords.
Although Ross's ventilation system was criticised by some of those
witnesses kindly disposed towards him [16], the members of the Royal
Commission did not feel disposed to attach any blame to Ross, and
conceded that Ross had depended too much on the improved air current
and adm onished him for not using bratticing [17]. Neither Rowan nor
M ackenzie ever complained to Ross about the impracticability of the
ventilation system. Until the explosion the system was considered to be
safe.

Evidence tendered by Rowan and M ackenzie at the Royal

Commission indicates that they were aware of alternative modes of
ventilation but had not considered it necessary to bring them to the
attention of Ross [18].
During the sitting o f the Royal Commission, a frequent criticism
of the Bulli ventilation system was that double doors were not generally
in use. Yet, no mention of double doors was made at the inquest by the
same witnesses, until a Bulli miner, M r John Hobbs, reminded them that
it was common to use double doors in Britain [19].

The single door

system used at Bulli frequently caused the derangement of the air current
and aggravated the build-up of gas. Because the doors had been placed
thoughtlessly in the air tunnels which were also the main traffic
thoroughfares, the doors had to be frequently opened to let up to twenty
skips past.

The ventilation of No. 1 and No. 2 headings was entirely

dependent on two single doors. In fact, the entire district and the life of
every workman in the district was also dependent on those two single
doors [20].
Ross did not feel that double doors were a necessity; neither did
the Commissioners, who believed that:
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(i)n the case o f Bulli, the lengths of trains would have
necessitated their being placed 160 feet apart. This under the
circumstances would have been impossible and the practice is
not pursued in any Australian colliery [21].
The circumstances which prevented the use o f double doors were
financial considerations only. This was typical of the parsimony which
prevailed in the industry during the nineteenth century; partially owing to
(lie intermittency o f trade, but also as a result of a traditional antipathy to
investment on equipm ent that was not considered necessary. There were
no practical obstacles for excluding the doors as Ross and the
Commissioners suggested. During the course of the Royal Commission,
there were numerous references made by Robertson, individual miners
and managers in relation to the high safety standards in Britain, yet these
standards were not implemented in N.S.W.

It would appear that the

unquestioning acceptance o f inadequate safety measures in N.S.W . in
general and by all concerned with the Bulli mine had led to the explosion.
The driving of headings and bords more than 35 yards ahead of
the air was another gross transgression of the CMRA [22], Generally, this
widespread malpractice was also motivated by cutting costs and served to
compound the problems associated with the ventilation system at Bulli.
As headings and bords were advanced they often came upon the problem
of the dykes and rolls, which m eant that production was hampered by the
mining of worthless stone.

A financial hurdle arose when the next

stenton to the adjoining heading or bord had to be cut through this waste
material.
To avoid this costly exercise, managers often ignored the CMRA
35 yard regulation.

They cut stentons only where coal was known to

exist. On occasions at Bulli, cut-throughs in bords and headings were
m ore than 42 yards ahead of the air. This illegal practice was condoned
by both Rowan and M ackenzie [23], On that breach of the CMRA alone,
Ross should have been charged by Rowan who was supposed to check the
distances between cut-throughs. Instead o f inspecting the entire colliery
once every eight weeks as stipulated by the CMRA [24], Rowan had
aggravated the ventilation and gas problem by not inspecting the mine
regularly [25], The Commissioners recorded:
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(e)xcepting Nos. 1 and 2 headings the Commission are inclined
to accept the testimony of the only trustworthy authority that
submitted themselves for examination - Mr. Inspector Rowan
who, although his visits were frequent, yet found no amount of
gas in this section, and the minute examination of the colliery by
the Commission confirms this [26].
The exception to evidence given by Rowan pertaining to heading Nos. 1
and 2 was probably a measure to safeguard Rowan's integrity because he
had claimed while giving evidence that he had never detected any gas
[27]. Contradictory to Rowan's evidence, the source of the explosion had
been heading No. 1 or No. 2, which confirmed the report by miners o f gas
in the area - this report incriminated Rowan.
Rowan's trustworthiness and reliability was central to the Royal
Commission's refutation of evidence given by the miners, particularly in
regard to the reporting of gas. During an inspection a few days after the
explosion, some of the Commissioners unofficially observed some gas in
headings No. 1 and 2 but they attributed that to the damage done to the
ventilation [28]. On 18 May during a subsequent official inspection, no
gas was detected in those headings. A slight amount of gas, however,
was detected in No. 3 heading. The Royal Commission put this down to
an improvement o f the partially repaired ventilation which showed a
reading of 2160 cubic feet of air per minute [29], The first inspection
should have indicated to the Commissioners that gas did issue in headings
No. 1 and 2, a fact which Rowan had denied. He claimed that he had
noticed a little gas in other headings only. The absence of gas during the
Royal Commission's inspection of 18 May confirmed the probability that
firedamp had appeared and reappeared due to its erratic nature, a fact
consistent with common nineteenth century mining knowledge [30].
The Commissioners' explanation that the absence of gas on that
occasion was due to the improved ventilation seems implausible; the
2160 cubic feet per minute was sufficient to disperse gas only when no
men were working. The Commissioners had at their disposal Rowan’s
report o f 9 August 1886, in which he recorded that the Hill End district
was supplied with 3600 cubic feet per minute for 36 men and horses [31].
The minimum amount of air allowable under the CMRA was 100 cubic
feet per man and horse per minute [32], Clearly, the ventilation could not
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have dispersed gas adequately during that inspection given the small
quantity of air.
The presence o f gas, as an additional problem to the ventilation
deficiency, raised great dissent during the sittings of the Royal
Commission. The pivotal argum ent was over the amount of gas reported.
Generally, miners claim ed that they had encountered large amounts of gas
while management and governm ent witnesses testified to small quantities
being present.

The Royal Commission believed the company and

government witnesses and discredited the evidence o f those men who had
worked in the No. 1 and No. 2 headings and had who witnessed large
quantities of gas.

The Commissioners and qualified experts need not

have played down evidence which supported large quantities of gas.
They were aware of, and had acknowledged that only small quantities of
gas were required to cause an explosion. In fact, with coaldust 1.9 to 9.8
per cent of gas volum e in the air is the critical range. Amounts of more
than 15 per cent renders the mixture almost harmless.

This was

consistent with the then scientific knowledge on the role o f gas and
coaldust in coal mine explosions [33], Those Commissioners with coal
mining expertise recognised coaldust as the real agent in an explosion
[34], Thus, the argument over the am ount of gas was redundant.
However, the denial o f the veracity of the reports by miners of
large amounts of gas was necessary for Ross's, Rowan's and Mackenzie's
exoneration.

W hen gas was encountered, several safety procedures

specified by the CMRA had to be observed.

They were, however,

ignored. These safety procedures consisted of recording in a book the
detection of gas, the removal o f the men if the amounts were considered
to be dangerous, the issue of safety lamps to the miners and the erection
of warning signals to alert m iners of the dangers. At Bulli no report book
was kept and the m en were not removed. The warning signals or dangerboards were erected, but ignored by miners.
The overturning of the miners' evidence increased as the
controversy over the quantities of gas escalated.

W hile having been

mildly censured for not making regular inspections of the pit, Ross, like
Rowan, was elevated in status as an expert witness.

In particular, his

evidence regarding the quantity of gas was considered to be reliable. The
Royal Commission recorded that:
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(t)he evidence of the Manager, Mr. Ross, who did not often
inspect the workings, and o f his overman, Richard White, points
to the presence of small quantities of gas only [35],
The reference to Ross's infrequent inspections is phrased in an
euphemistic fashion. Ross seemed to possess only a poor knowledge of
the underground workings. After the explosion, while leading a search
party, he was forced to concede that he had lost his way [36], Obviously,
Ross lost his way because of the infrequent number of inspections he had
made of the mine.

Accordingly, his knowledge of gas problems in

different parts of the mine must be suspect.
Several experienced miners who had worked in headings No. 1
and 2 had reported large quantities o f gas before and after the strike, and
gave evidence accordingly [37]. One drillhole in the face of the No. 1
heading em itted so much gas that it could be heard to 'hum' some 40
yards away [38],

W hile this volume of gas was not dangerous it

suggested the presence of firedamp which the Royal Commission was so
intent on denying. The Commission refuted the miners claims, recording
that:
(t)his starting [j/c] statement emanated from men who had no
extensive knowledge of mining or any previous experience of
firedamp [39];
and:
(i)n other respects the statements o f these witnesses were not
borne out by those of calmer more intelligent and truthful men
[40],
Those calmer, more intelligent and truthful men were the miners whose
evidence had supported the evidence of management and Department of
Mines officers.
W hen the deputy James Crawford was shown the hummer - an
audible issue of gas, he inserted a gas pipe with a tap into the drillhole to
convince Ross and White of the large quantities of firedamp [41]. The
purpose of the tap was to allow the gas to escape only when it was turned
on.

In the presence of Ross and White, the gas was lit by Crawford,
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irresponsibly with a naked light. The force of the gas was so strong that it
extinguished the flame if the tap was turned on more than half way [42],
The above act of bravado demonstrates the small regard miners
had even toward their own safety.

Under examination by Robertson,

Ross played down the size o f the blower. He claimed that Crawford had
inserted the pipe in the hole to show his ingenuity [43], The Commission
readily accepted Ross's explanation, recording that there was:
... evidence of a small blower in No. 1 heading from whence gas
issued for some weeks into which a pipe was fixed. It, however
appears to have issued with no great force [44],
Ross, nevertheless, with justification protested to the Commission about
Crawford's use of a naked light under such dangerous circumstances [45],
Ironically, Ross' protestation about Crawford's use o f a naked light in a
gas laden atmosphere corroborated the miners' evidence concerning gas.
The company had implicitly acknowledged the existence of firedamp by
distributing safety lamps. Safety lamps had to be issued once firedamp
was encountered in accordance with the Special Rules.
The purpose of the Davy safety lamp was twofold. It was used
by deputies to detect gas, as firedamp is undetectable by human senses,
being tasteless, odourless and colourless. Even today, similar principles
apply to the detection o f gas. The size and colour of the flame determines
the volume and constitution of the gas. If the volume of gas is greater
than the volume o f air, the flame will extinguish automatically.
second use of the safety lamp is as its name implies.

The

The flame is

enclosed by two separate gauzes and a glass case. Air can enter the lamp,
but the flame cannot escape and ignite the gas outside the lamp.
The method of distribution and the abuse of safety lamps at Bulli
was in direct contravention of the CMRA [46].

The dependence by

miners on the safety lamp demanded that a strict maintenance policy be
observed. Evidence had been given by miners that they had been issued
with safety lamps with a faulty gauze and in one instance, without even a
gauze [47]. A lamp without a gauze would be as unsafe as a naked light.
The gauzes deteriorated very rapidly as it was a common mining practice
to light fuses from an open lamp. This deterioration was brought on by
tilting the lamp which caused oil to spill onto the gauze, which would
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turn red hot, making the lighting of fuses easier. An alternative method
was to hold a wire or a kerosene soaked 'touch paper’ on the gauze and
then to light the fuse.
Although

these

techniques

were

criticised

by

the

Commissioners, no alternative methods of lighting explosives were
proposed by members of the Commission, nor were other methods
provided for by the company. The same witnesses who had reported the
hummer also claimed they had been issued with faulty lamps. It was no
surprise to find out that they were dismissed as being unreliable witnesses
[48]. Ross's failure to ensure that safety lamps were locked, cleaned and
fitted with gauzes was not deemed punishable by the Commission.
Once the existence of gas was established, safety lamps had to
be circulated to miners in the affected section. The CMRA specified:
(w)henever any safety lamp is required to be used it shall be first
exam ined and securely locked by some person duly authorized
for that purpose who shall keep the key thereof [49].
Those regulations were not adhered to by either the overman, or the
deputies after the strike.

Ross did not ensure that his instructions

concerning the locking of safety lamps were observed.

From the

Commissioners’ point o f view:
Mr. Ross issued instructions to his overman and deputies to lock
all lamps; but that for some cause, and unknown to Mr. Ross,
this order had not been strictly carried out for some weeks
preceding the explosion. At the same time the Commission are
fully aware how very difficulty it is to get subordinates to carry
out orders in their integrity [50].
The issue of safety lamps was an unpopular one with miners
because they gave off a very dim, flickering, orange coloured light. In
general, miners preferred to work with the brighter naked light and were
determined to m ake use of this m ethod of lighting even if safety
regulations were flouted in the process.

W hile the safety lamps were

easily extinguished by even a slight disturbance, they were very hard to
light again if they were locked. The illumination of miners' immediate
working quarters was entirely dependent on two dim safety lights. Miners
at Bulli and elsewhere worked on piece-rates in teams of two and for the

52

Bulli mining disaster 1887

reasons explained in Chapter Two were anxious about lost time if their
light was accidendy extinguished. Before the strike, an extinguished light
often resulted in a long walk by one of the team to the deputy's cabin in
order to have the lamp lit as all lights were kept under lock and key by
Crawford. This time consuming process was considered an annoyance by
the men and whenever possible, the miners tried to avoid working with
locked lights despite the obvious dangers associated with this procedure.
After the strike, Crawford was not re-engaged and most of the time the
new deputy, Millwood, did not bother to lock the lamps. Miners readily
took advantage of M illwood’s casual style of management by working
with unlocked lights in gas laden sections of the mine despite the
presence of firedamp [51].
The safety lamps at Bulli were only locked with a simple device
which was easily unlatched with any sharp implement [52]. During one
nightshirt when no deputy had been provided, the men opened their lamp
by using the key which had been left behind for that purpose by Millwood
on the previous shift [53]. W hen questioned about this occurrence during
the Commission, the miners recounted how they were confused as to what
action to take if their light should go out without a deputy on duty. Mr
Albert Smithers said in evidence that:
(o)n M onday night, when we first started after the strike, we
went to the cabin for our lamps and M illwood handed us our
lamps locked. Richards said to him, "What are we to do if we
get in the dark?" and M illwood said, "I will leave the key", so he
unlocked the lamps and never locked the lamps afterwards [54].
This appeared to corroborate that M illwood had been negligent
in his duties.

However, such evidence was discredited by the

Commissioners because of the implicit faith Ross placed in Millwood's
capacity as a deputy. Smithers' evidence was dealt with accordingly [55],
Smithers had given the sam e evidence at the inquest and the transcript
was read to him verbatim at the Commission. During the inquest he had
stated that Millwood had never locked his lamp, although he testified at
the Commission that he had admitted that Millwood had briefly locked
his lamp and then immediately unlocked it. The Commissioners branded
him as a perjurer because of his use of the word 'never' in a vernacular
sense [56],
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The management at Bulli rarely enforced strict discipline and the
men responded accordingly. Miners were used to smoking in the 'gassy
district' and were permitted to carry tobacco and matches underground.
W hile the Special Rules provided that a danger-board be erected across
the entrance of any section where firedamp was found [57], this
procedure was not always strictly followed. In the No. 1 heading where
sizeable amounts o f gas issued, a danger-board was hung at the last
stenton.

Nevertheless, the miners continued to smoke carelessly just

outside the danger-board.
The night before the explosion Thomas Morgan, a wheeler, had
hung his naked light on the danger-board after he was requested to do so
by M r W illiam Hope, an experienced miner. Notwithstanding that his
light was 28 yards from the face, the action ignited firedamp with a sheet
of flame m ore than 4 yards long [58]. As no official was present during
the incident, neither Hope, Morgan, nor any of the men working that shift
bothered to report the incident to W hite the overman, or to any other
official. The men had become so accustomed to the elements o f danger
and so fam iliar with working under life threatening conditions that after
their shift they did not consider it necessary to call at White's house which
was near the p it to report the sudden eruption of gas. Another motivation
on the part of the men for not reporting the incident to White was fear. It
was generally believed by Bulli miners that they would lose their job if
they reported any danger.
The reason miners gave for not reporting particular hazards was
die belief that the 'Engagement Rules of the Bulli Colliery’ precluded
them from reporting anything to the manager or Department of Mines
inspector. The section which miners misinterpreted was rule No. 6 which
decreed that:
(a)ny employee interfering in any way with the orders issued by
the colliery manager or his overman for regulating the work of
the mine shall be liable to dismissal without notice [59].
Rule No. 6 was preceded by Rule No. 5 which stated that:
(t)he colliery manager shall have full command over all
employees in or about this colliery. They shall apply to, and

54

Bulli mining disaster 1887

take their orders and instructions from him or such other person
as may be appointed to act on his behalf [60],
Notwithstanding the miners' misinterpretations of Rules No. 5 and 6, one
candid reason why they could not report the dangerous situation was the
fact that according to Rule No. 3 of the Engagement Rules, miners could
not leave their allotted working place. Rule No. 3 stated that:
(a)ny m iner or other employee found in any part of the mine or
colliery other than that in which he should be working without
the consent of the colliery manager, shall be liable to dismissal
without notice [61].
Each man at Bulli had signed the Engagement Rules as part of
the agreement reached with the company to settle the strike. In essence,
refusal m eant unemployment.

Intimidated and menaced after the

prolonged strike, the majority of miners signed the 'Engagement Rules'
without fully realising the restrictive nature of the Rules which were
drafted in accordance with the CMRA Special Rules section which gave
them a legal status. Although the Special Rules and Engagement Rules
could be used to invoke prosecution under the archaic Masters and
Servants Act for small offences such as absence from work, the
Commissioners refused to understand the logic behind the miners'
misconstruction of the rules. The Commissioners were unable:
... to comprehend how intelligent men could permit themselves
to be persuaded to display such pusillanimity and to pervert or
torture the words "That any interference with the orders of the
Manager" into meaning that they must not report danger,
especially as they admitted that no orders had been issued by the
M anager to the effect that men were not to report danger and that
they did not ask the manager whether Rule 6 would bear the
interpretation given it be Nicholson and others [62],
Indeed, m ost miners admitted under cross-examination that no
direct order had been given by Ross not to report danger.

The

Commission's interpretation was absurd; no manager would give direct
orders to that effect.

The failure to report danger was due to a

misinterpretation of the rules by the miners because o f the hierarchical
relationship implicit in relationships between miners and managers.
Miners felt restricted by social barriers and reinforced by a false sense of
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security and bravado to dangerous situations they simply failed to take
action and report the hazard.
The Commission, nevertheless, continued its harassment over
the men's interpretation o f the Engagem ent Rules by attacking the
IM M PA and its nominal head, M r John Barnes Nicholson, who as
secretary o f the Illawarra Miners' Mutual Protective Association had been
the first person to misinterpret Rule No. 6. Once union members had
accepted Nicholson's interpretation he had not bothered to relay to
m anagement the miners' misgivings about the rules.

He also failed to

make a formal criticism of the rules. Moreover, Nicholson could have
made a severe and telling criticism of the company as he had not been re
employed by the company after the strike, and therefore was not bound
by Rule No. 6. W ishing to avoid industrial and personal confrontation,
Nicholson claimed he had known about the perilous condition of the
mine, but had not reported it to management.
Less than two weeks before the explosion, Nicholson had
ominously predicted the destruction o f the mine, yet he allowed the men
to continue working. Mr. Jerry W estwood, the miner to whom the cause
of the explosion was attributed, told Nicholson less than a fortnight
before the explosion about a hum m er which could be heard 100 yards
away. Nicholson's prophetic reply was ' God help you; one of these days
you will get it' [63],

That response had been Nicholson's only known

reaction, he did not feel he had the right to interfere as he claimed
correctly that everyone including management, knew about the excessive
quantities of gas [64]. Nicholson sought to shield his own ambivalence in
the m atter behind the union's past dealings with management.

When

Robertson asked Nicholson:
(h)olding the responsible position you do and being the leader of
others, did you no think it was your own duty to take steps to
avert such an evil as that?,
he replied as a m atter of fact:
I did not think I had any right whatever [65].
The reasons why Nicholson did not report the danger to the
company at first appear obscure. Even Edgar Ross, who was intent on the
glorification o f miners as the archetypal worker in A History o f the
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Miners' Federation o f Australia is forced to frown upon Nicholson's
behaviour [66],

Ross maintains that Nicholson, although being a

conscientious union secretary, consistently opposed industrial action, and
in this light he could be seen as a class collaborator [67],

Perhaps

Nicholson's ambivalence could be explained by his political ambitions
which were realised in 1891 when he was elected as the Labor member
for Illawarra. By 1887 he may well have been sensitive to the distaste
coalmine owners had to measures that would require the implementation
of costly safety devices. In a sitting of Parliament in 1892 during one of
many debates on the ill-fated Coal M ining Regulation Bill. Nicholson
held that bratticing would not only save miners' lives, but that:
(i)t would also be a financial saving to m ine owners ... and I feel
certain that the money paid by the mine-owners in the shape of
damages and for law costs would have provided brattice for the
w hole o f that mine for the next ten years to come. Everyone
knows w hat the price of lumber is and if they want to use
anything cheaper they can use canvas; which will answer the
purpose as well [68].
Nicholson once elected as an official Labor candidate refused to sign 'the
pledge' along with several other Labor miner parliamentarians for reasons
I have explained elsewhere [69]. Subsequently, Nicholson stood as an
independent Labor candidate in the 1898 election [70],

Although he

rejoined the Labor Party, he was eventually expelled in 1916 [71]. His
obituary reflects his political pragmatism ;uid reads in part:
Mr. Nicholson was one who had a difficulty which he sometimes
failed to overcome in subordinating him self to party ... . Mr.
Nicholson more than once uttered to mass meetings words of
comments and advice that displeased and thereby he
undoubtedly lost supporters [72],
Nicholson was reprimanded by the Commission over his apathy in
reporting danger prior to the explosion. As far as the Commission was
concerned:
Mr. Nicholson's c o n d u c t..., if he really did know of danger and
took no steps to communicate with the inspector, the Minister
for M ines, or his late fellow workmen, betrays an obliquity of
character that they [the commissioners] sincerely trust is
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uncommon in the Colony, and will m eet with censure that it so
deservedly merits [73].
Ironically,

while

the

Commissioners

were

casting

aspersions

on

Nicholson's character, they again contradicted their own observations
regarding the quantities of gas present at Bulli.

They had maintained

during the course of the Commission and in their summation, that the
quantities o f gas were small.

Yet, w hile Nicholson was being cross-

examined, the Commissioners had inadvertently admitted to the existence
of large quantities o f gas in their eagerness to condemn him .
This is one example of several contradictions found when the
summation is compared to the verbal evidence.

The Commission

distorted evidence from witness to witness to suit their convictions. In
their summation the Commissioners accepted both Ross' and Rowan's
alleged ignorance of the role of coaldust as a result of the dearth of
scientific publications on the subject, even though both had admitted to a
full knowledge of the dangers of coaldust during their examination [74],
In contrast, the miners were considered reckless if they were guilty of
even the sm allest oversight.
Despite overwhelming evidence against Ross, Rowan and
M ackenzie

their

credibility

was

alm ost unassailable.

Examiner

M ackenzie's flight of fancy concerning his dynamite plot was the only
rejection

by

the Commission of m ajor evidence given by both

Government and company witnesses. Clearly, the Commission ignored
the fact that according to the CMRA, the ultimate responsibility lay with
managers and Department of Mines officials.

The condemnation of

miners completed an exercise in bureaucratic evasion of responsibility,
begun by the Government to subvert justice and to save money.

The

m iners could not rely on the expertise of their peers, neither could they
rely on their ineffectual union, decimated by the prolonged 1886-87
strike/lock-out, nor its discredited secretary: Nor could the miners redress
the blame attributed to them, as Royal Commissioners are immune from
civil or criminal proceedings under law [75]. Witnesses, however, did
not receive the same protection under the law and could be required to
appear by summons, and fined for refusing to answer questions.
The Royal Commissioners used the powers given to them by law
selectively to discriminate against the miners.
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judgem ent in favour of the interlocking interests of state and capital. The
judgement also allowed an ineffectual Department o f Mines inspectorate
to continue to administer an equally ineffective Coal M ines Regulation
Act.
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CHAPTER SIX
6 The Departm ent of Mines and the Coal M ines Regulation Act, 1876
The A ct is a perfect paradise for lawyers and a thorough failure
(Mr. Thompson, acting for the Department of Mines against
Brown's M inmi mine, 1882 (Votes and Proceedings, 1887-88,

(8): 220).
The deliberations of the Royal Commission provoked an angry
response among the mining communities. Newspapers took up the cause
with articles recommending greater government supervision and stricter
vigilance by Department of Mines officers. Also, the 1876 CMRA came
under close scrutiny and was found wanting.

These are not surprising

reactions as the Act was originally framed by a legislative body
comprising several mine owners.

These parliamentary coal mine

proprietors had restricted legislation which would have imposed heavy
costs in the provision of safety measures.
An investigation [ 1] of the financial interests of parliamentarians
in 1876 indicates that 5 of the 10 man M inistry which introduced the Bill
were either owners or directors of coal mines. The Premier of the time,
Mr. John Robertson, and Mr. Alexander Stuart, the Colonial Treasurer,
were co-owners of the Coalcliff Colliery. Mr. Thomas Garrett, Secretary
for Lands had extensive holdings in mines throughout the colony and Mr.
John Lucas, the M inister for Mines, was a director of several coalmines
while

Mr.

directorship

John

Fitzgerald

Bums,

of several coalmining

Postmaster-General,

also held

companies and companies

in

associated industries. The Legislative Council, comprising 38 members,
accounted for no less than 14 known owners or directors of coal mines.
The 68 m em ber Legislative Assembly accounted for another 20 known
coalmine owners and directors, and a further three members were active
in companies in industries associated with coal mining.

Even the

Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, had direct interests in coal.
N ot surprisingly, the 1876 CMRA was accepted only after being
delayed in the Assembly by numerous readings, amendments and
committee meetings; it was then returned from the Council with several
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amendments [2].

The subsequent 1896 CMRA, which was first

introduced in 1889, partly as a reaction to the Bulli disaster, shared a
similar, albeit m ore tortuous passage in Parliament.

This ill-fated Bill,

despite the obvious deficiencies of the 1876 CMRA, was read and rejected
several times, referred to numerous select committees, underwent a Royal
Commission and finally given assent after seven years [3],
A great weakness of the 1876 CMRA was that it did not give
Department o f M ines officers the precise power of prosecution.
Notwithstanding, officers m ade full use of loopholes in the Act to their
advantage. Once the A ct was established few authorities, apart from the
Department o f M ines, ensured that the Act was adequately observed. The
inspectorate's

pronouncements

were

almost

unchallenged

and

its

judgements invariably endorsed at ministerial level.
The only challenge to the inspectorate's mandate came from
miners, who under the CMRA were entitled to appoint check-inspectors,
who could check inspection results of both the Department of Mines and
management each month and record their findings in a report book [4],
Superficially,

the assignment of these powers to miners appears

benevolent, but the process was difficult to implement in practice.
Managers were empowered under the same regulation o f the CMRA to
accompany check-inspectors on their inspections although the resence of
a mine m anager was frequently an intimidating influence on the checkinspector. At the Bulli mine the possibility of being dismissed under No.
6 of the Special Rules and the added inconvenience o f miners having to
contribute to the wages o f the check-inspectors from their own income
forestalled the implementation o f the check-inspector scheme [5].
The Departm ent of Mines was autonomous, almost a law unto
itself. The Departm ent consisted of several independent sub-departments
representing various metalliferous branches, a geological branch, as well
as the Coalfields Branch, each led by a perm anent executive officer.
These officers were responsible to the Under Secretary, and through this
line of command to the Secretary or M inister of M ines. The Minister
responsible for m ines in 1887 was Mr. Francis Abigail, who had taken on
this hapless position only a few months prior to the Bulli disaster.
Abigail's lack of mining expertise is understandable as he was a boot
manufacturer by vocation [6],

However, despite being misled by
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unreliable officers, even when proof existed of their dereliction of duty,
this was overlooked [7].
At the inspectorate level, inspector Rowan and examiner
M ackenzie either knowingly or unknowingly failed to perform their
assigned tasks. These two officers gave tacit approval of practices which
contravened the CMRA, and this alone is a damning indictment of the
Coalfields Branch of the Department o f Mines in the light of the fact that
they represented one half of its entire inspectorate.

The whole of the

Colony o f N.S.W . was represented by only three inspectors and one
examiner. Ultimately, Mackenzie was responsible for the lives of more
than 8,000 miners in N.S.W. in 1887.
Because o f the tremendous responsibility associated with his
duties, M ackenzie's annual income in 1876 was £600 which was
increased by £50 by 1887 [8].

In addition, he received travelling

expenses and was allowed to accept payment for surveys he undertook
from private mining concerns.

From the latter source, Mackenzie

received an additional £1,800 in the period 1871 to 1876 [9].

This

lucrative supplement to his official income placed him in the invidious
position o f having to enforce the CMRA against proprietors who had
previously employed him as a surveyor. Mackenzie's only predicament
was when he had to invoke the CMRA against the members of parliament
who owned or had interests in coalmines.
The one way the examiner's position could be endangered was
by incurring parliamentary censure.

Under the CMRA, the examiner

could only be sacked by the Governor in conjunction with the Executive
Council [10]. Like parliamentarians, M ackenzie was supposed to uphold
the law even if the law worked against personal and financial interests.
However, it appears that Mackenzie made use of his position to evade as
many legal obstacles as possible. There is also evidence of one instance
of collusion between M ackenzie and parliamentarians [11]. Mackenzie's
situation was especially compromised when he was required to pass
judgem ent during the Bulli Inquest and Royal Commission on the Hon.
G. A. Lloyd, M.L.C. and a director of the Bulli Coal Mining Company for
whom M ackenzie had performed private surveys [12].
Abigail, perhaps lamenting the examiner's political connections,
or perhaps because of their mutual collusion, refused to set into motion
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the necessary parliamentary action to dismiss Mackenzie, even though
M ackenzie's m isconduct was known to him by 1887. Abigail was forced
to defend M ackenzie during various parliamentary assaults made on the
Department o f M ines and its policies by those few parliamentarians who
took up the miners' cause. Ironically, Abigail was engaged in 1887 in a
Supreme Court litigation against Mackenzie, who contrary to the CMRA,
was a proprietor o f a coalmine [13]. Section 27 o f the CMRA had been
included as a measure to address the absurd situation of having an official
enforce the law against his own coalmine [14], Abigail did not force the
examiner to resign or to sell his coalmine. Instead, when Mackenzie’s
crime had been discovered, he replied in Parliament as follows:
(a)s soon as the Supreme Court has given a decision, the
Examiner of Coalfields will have to give up his interest in the
m ine [15],
Because o f Mackenzie's coal mining interests, a prolonged
campaign against M ackenzie and Abigail was conducted in Parliament by
Mr. Ninian M elville [16]. That this action was justified is supported by
Mackenzie's conduct during the Bulli inquest and Royal Commission.
Melville initially began criticizing Mackenzie in 1885 because he had not
rectified blatant ventilation deficiencies in the Northern district.

Also,

Melville claimed that Mackenzie had surveyed and then allowed mining
to proceed so close to the surface that the main road from Lambton and
Waratah to W allsend had collapsed [17],
Thomas Croudace.

The mine was owned by

M elville renewed his intimidating stance toward

Mackenzie when die examiner provided startling and controversial
evidence during the Bulli inquest.
After several witnesses had testified at the inquest that the
explosion had occurred in No. 2 heading, M ackenzie as the last witness
claimed that the explosion had been caused by dynamite elsewhere in the
mine. This sudden contradiction of evidence so startled the gathering that
the coroner immediately adjourned the inquest to the Bulli pit for further
investigation. W hen the court resumed sitting, Mackenzie held that an
original explosion had taken place in the main tunnel, 374 yards from the
mine adit and that the explosion in No. 2 heading had only been a
secondary explosion as a consequence of the first [18]. He claimed that

63

Bulli mining disaster 1887

dynamite had been set off deliberately, by a person or persons for
revenge.

M ackenzie was hinting at the viciousness of the warfare

between m iners and blacklegs, although he was not explicit in making
this claim. Because of the radical nature of this evidence, Mackenzie was
forced to explain him self in a report ordered by Parliament to investigate
his evidence.

N ot even the Royal Commission, despite its prejudice

against miners, believed Mackenzie's absurd dynamite hypothesis, and
the Commissioners concurred that '(t)he suggestion of explosives infers
malice o f no ordinary kind' [19].

The examiner, trying to salvage his

reputation after reading the report of the Royal Commission, replied in
response to accusations made against him in Parliament claiming that:
(o)ur gaols are filled with criminals who have given play to
"malice of no ordinary kind" - ships have been sunk, buildings
have been burnt and blown up, railway trains have been upset,
m urders of all kinds have been committed, and collieries have
been set on fire and subjected to other disasters, all from malice
aforethought time out o f mind, and the like will happen again
until the M illenium [,v/c| arrives. And with regard to arson in
connection with coal-mining, it was found necessary to pass an
Act in England, in 1736, providing that any person who "wilfully
and maliciously set on fire, or caused to be set on fire, any mine,
pit, or delph of coal, or cannel coal, and being thereby lawfully
convicted, shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer
death, as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy" [20].
M ackenzie's need

to cling

to the dynamite theory was

compounded by his social position and his concern for his damaged
reputation. He supported the technical aspect of his dynamite theory with
an interpretation of the manner of derangement of the props and the
position o f the door o f the W estern Main tunnel junction. Because props
had been found lying in all directions, he held that the proximity of the
tunnel m outh was the point of explosion [21]. During the inquest and the
Royal Commission he had supported this evidence with the type of
damage and position of the Western junction door, which had been blown
30 yards inbye [22]. After a period o f initial surprise by experts at the
inquest, the Royal Commission had gathered sufficient evidence to show
that the recoil o f the explosion in No. 2 heading had caused the
disarranging of the props and the inward dislocation of the door [23],
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Diagnoses of mine explosions before and after 1887 show that
explosion recoil will cause the type o f chaos like that found at Bulli. It
appears that M ackenzie was either ignorant of, or chose to ignore
nineteenth century scientific work on the effects of recoil in mine
explosions. W . N. and J. B. Atkinson's Explosions in Coal Mines, is one
textbook which was available in 1887 [24] and describes in detail the
results of recoil in a mine explosion.
M ackenzie's

dynamite

plot

was

further

tested

by

the

Commissioners because they held that no one could place and fire
explosives without being seen in the busiest part o f the mine during the
busiest part of the day [25]. Furthermore, testimony had recorded that no
one came out o f the mine in the one and a half hours before the explosion
[26]. M ackenzie's luckless saboteur had suicidal tendencies as he must
have perished by his own actions. Nevertheless, the Commission did not
implicate M ackenzie in any manner, although his dynamite theory was a
fabrication. Even when it was discovered during a cross examination that
he could not define the precise nature of the examiner's duties as
delineated under the CMRA, the Commissioners neglected to criticise his
incompetence, in fact, they did not even mention 4it.

It appears they

castigated his hypothesis only to avert further parliamentary and press
criticism. They dismissed Mackenzie's folly without any reference to his
neglect of duty. The Commission failed to discover any:
cogent reasons to support this remarkable propositions of Mr.
M ackenzie, or any circumstance that can justify the enunciation
o f such views [27],
Columnists, in their press reports after the revelation of the
dynamite hypothesis,

sniggered at the examiner.

The Illawarra

Mercury reported Mr. Ninian M elville's speech m ade at the Railway
Hotel, Bulli, in which he gleefully intimated to an appreciative crowd that
'(s)ome Guy Fawks [sic] had got into the district and blown the mine up’
[28], Jibes were frequently made about the examiner's conduct during the
inquest and Royal Commission. Melville accused the examiner of being
always 'three-parts drunk', a fool, a scoundrel and a murderer [29], An
editorial in the Illawarra Mercury proclaimed that:
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Mr. M ackenzie on his part did not appear to have "favourably
impressed" the Commission, as his pet theory is shattered to
atom s - ... it now appears that this gentleman (who bye-the-bye
holds no certificate of competency and who strange to say was
elevated to the m ost responsible position in the Mines
D epartm ent notwithstanding his circumstance) contemplates
retiring from his position-probably on a pension [30],
The m otivation for Mackenzie's bent for the dynamite theory seems quite
malevolent when it is considered that the source of his information was
Mr. G. Hamilton, the general m anager of the Bulli Coal Mining
Company.

Hamilton had placed one of the company's steamships, the

Woonona, at M ackenzie's disposal to bring him from Sydney to the
inquest a t Bulli.

During the journey Hamilton had suggested to

M ackenzie that he had heard from an unspecified source that dynamite
had caused the explosion [31].
Both M ackenzie and Hamilton could only profit if the blame was
attributed to miners instead of the company. The Department o f Mines
also would appear in a better light if miners were blamed. Mackenzie's
gain would be the guarantee of a lucrative source of employment as a
surveyor, a duty he had performed for the company in the past.
Hamilton's benefit would be the possible waiver of the large compulsory
payments made to the victims' relatives under the Employers' Liability
Act o f 1886 [32].
The Bulli Coal Mining Company had been running at a loss
during the fiscal year of 1886-1887, and required an additional
subscription to a new share issue [33].

The bad publicity that would

result from proven culpability would have frightened away the much
needed new investors. In short, the company would face ruin. An article
appearing in the Daily Telegraph the day after the Bulli disaster, alleged
that the use o f deceptive measures o f this kind was common to the
coalmining industry. The article stated:
(t)here has been, it is alleged, by those who are supposed to be
competent authorities an unworthy attempt to throw dust in the
eyes o f the public and create an unsound sense of security on the
part o f innocent spectators (who have capital to lose but much
experience to gain) by the endeavour to establish unwarranted
confidence in the safety of working our coal seams [34],
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D espite the tactics of both Hamilton and M ackenzie, the Bulli
inquest jury found in favour of the miners. The wide publication of the
jury's verdict cast suspicion over the activities and competencies of the
Department of M ines and the Bulli Coal Mining Company. Although the
verdict did not incriminate Mackenzie directly, he felt that its biased
nature assailed his professional standing in the community [35],
Accordingly, he strongly attacked any opponent o f his dynamite theory.
As a result o f M ackenzie's prolonged argument on this subject, Melville
continued to question the examiner's mining expertise. The criticism of
his mining proficiency seemed to be well founded.

However, a

parliamentary report of 1887-8 investigating Mackenzie's conduct came
to the opposite conclusion.

Copies of references supplied by the

examiner to counteract the accusations made by Melville, reveal that
Mackenzie had obtained the necessary qualifications to assume the
responsibility o f the position of examiner in England [36], Even so, it
would appear that M ackenzie had an obvious preference for a lucrative
private practice, as opposed to his required official duties.
In defence o f charges of neglecting his duties, Mackenzie
remonstrated that he and his inspectors had to cope with too many duties.
The examiner's protests were partially justified. There* were only three
inspectors and M ackenzie had to supervise 74 mines and 8,118 men in
1887 [37],

However, instead of easing the problem of staff shortage,

M ackenzie compounded the matter by utilising a curious territorial
division.

Inspector Rowan had 32 out of the 74 mines in the Colony

under his supervision, including the W estern as well as the Southern
coalfields. Inspector John Dixon and inspector Thomas Bates shared the
remaining 42 mines which were in the Northern district, with Mackenzie
inspecting none.

Clearly, a better territorial distribution would have

alleviated some o f the examiner's problems in regard to staff shortage.
M ackenzie's repeated reference to the deficiencies of the 1876
CMRA cannot be attributed entirely to parliamentarians as he claimed.
He and his inspectors were consulted during the passage of the Bill and
were asked to contribute towards its formulation in parliament [38].
Mackenzie's acknowledgement of staff shortage and weakness in the Act
should have m ade him m ore aware of the necessity for more thorough
inspections. He could have relieved the staffing situation by inspecting
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some mines himself. Indeed, he was required under the CMRA to make
such inspections, a task which he felt was beneath the dignity of his high
position [39], Instead, the examiner chose to rely on second hand and
sometimes incorrect information from his inspectors as he seldom visited
the mines in his capacity as examiner [40], In the instance of the Bulli
colliery M ackenzie's vital knowledge of gas and ventilation had been
based entirely on the inadequate inspections of inspector Rowan, who in
turn had used the equally uninformed manager, Alexander Ross [41].
The element of truth in M ackenzie's denunciation of the Act was
the role parliamentarians had played in its creation.

In addition,

successive governments since 1876 had neglected to provide adequate
financial means to employ officers and purchase the equipment required
for the A ct's implementation.

Quite clearly, four men could not have

protected m ore than 8,000 lives in m ore than 70 locations. Mackenzie
was

severely

criticised because

of his ready

unwillingness and inability to inspect mines.

admission

of his

When he reiterated his

unwillingness to m ake mine inspections at the Royal Commission [42],
the Illawarra M ercury concluded that:
(i)t would be interesting to know what Mr. M'Kenzie [sic]
actually does for the fat salary he draws, and from what sources
other than the Inspectors he obtains his information on mining
matters. Certainly not from personal observation. This highly
paid but little worked official actually visited the mine a week
before the explosion-nay more he was inside the mine-and
though he was aware that gas was giving off and was well aware
o f the danger therefrom, he did not think it his duty as Examiner
o f Coalfields, to go into the gassy section to see for himself, if
the ventilation was sufficient to cope with the gas giving off
[43],
The Bulli disaster continued to be the lowest ebb of Mackenzie's career as
he persisted in his vituperous defense campaign.

In support of his

dynamite hypothesis in a reply to the parliamentary report held to
investigate his conduct, he cited miners and their unions as the real
culprits of the Bulli m ine explosion, stating:
... I wish to point out that there is a peculiarity in reference to the
administration of the Coal Mines Regulation Act which does not
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appear to be realised or understood by the general public. In no
branch o f the Civil Service are officials subjected to such direct
and persistent criticism from outside sources as the Examiner
and Inspectors of Collieries. By the very nature of their duties
they are thrust between two contending elements that are ever
wrangling and jarring with each other-capital and labour. Do
w hat they may, it is impossible for them to escape
animadversion, for in every dispute which they are called upon
to investigate they are m et with the consciousness that whatever
decisions they may pronounce they must give dissatisfaction to
one side or the other. The records o f the office constantly show
this. If they challenge malpractices on the part of the owners or
managers, appeals are constantly made to the Minister, coupled
with passionate remonstrances, sometimes suggesting improper
m otives, and nearly always charging officers with unnecessary
interference and officiousness. If complaints come from the
miners, and upon investigation some o f them are found to be
frivolous, and not deserving of any serious notice, the officers
are denounced with either neglect of duty, incompetence or
corruption, in language plentifully sprinkled with the vilest
epithets which insolence, ingenuity, or malice can invent. There
is no organisation of labour which is knitted together, and which
has such special privileges, as that of the coalminers. No other
class o f artisans are able, as they are, through the inevitable
concentration of their numbers, to return Members of Parliament
specially to represent them, and no other mechanics are able to
m aintain such internal organisation as they possess. It seems to
be an idea among them that the only way to keep Government
officials at the highest pitch of tension in the performance of
their duties is to be perpetually finding fault with them, and so
officials are subjected, with or without reason, to a never ceasing
carping criticism. Every mine has a recognised coterie of his
own, whose business it is to settle petty details. These coteries
join in forming district councils, and the whole merge in a
com bined association, with paid officials, whose business in life
is to show the necessity of their employment by exhibiting real
or pretended vigilance in the interest of those who employ them.
Their paid mission is to find fault and stir up every conceivable
form o f agitation, and he is naturally accepted as the most
worthy o f confidence who can hunt up m ost subjects o f dispute
and scold in the strongest language and with the loudest lungs
[44],
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M ackenzie's social and political inclinations became apparent in
this harangue, and they m ust have played an important part in his role
during the inquest and the Royal Commission.

N ot only was the

unfortunate examiner harassed by unrelenting union officials, but he also
found that in nearly every Northern colliery miners had observed Section
30 o f the CMRA and appointed check-inspectors, who w e re '... ever on the
watch in the endeavour to find Government officials tripping ...' [45].
According to Mackenzie, miners need not have feared any retribution on
his part. His defence to the accusations continued thus:
I am acquainted with the idiosyncrasies of miners, and it is
perhaps because I know them so well, and they are aware that I
know them, that I am so frequently subjected to evidences of the
disfavour of their leaders [46],
M ackenzie tried to conceal his prejudice against the miners by
demonstrating that he had often prosecuted managers for breaches of the
CMRA. This was a feeble defensive ploy as evidence shows that most of
the offending managers only paid a trifling fine and continued to flout the
Act with the implicit blessing of the Department [47], The real bane of
coalmining companies was the closure o f mines, an this action was only
once resorted to by Mackenzie and his inspectors during the period
described in this book.

This situation occurred with the threatened

closure of the C oalcliff Colliery as a direct result of the Department of
Mines' bad publicity six weeks after the Bulli disaster. Inspector Rowan
had recom m ended that Coalcliff Colliery be closed down because of a
dangerous subsidence of the surface near the pit entrance [48],

So

unusual was this reaction by the Department of Mines that former
adversaries, the miners and owners o f the Coalcliff pit, formed a
deputation to convince Mr. Abigail, the M inister responsible, to
countermand the closure order. Abigail commented that:
(t)he officers of the Department had been severely censured in
certain quarters for neglect of their duty, and this had woke them
up to a sense of greater anxiety to fulfill their duty [49].
In reply to a question in the Parliament by Ninian Melville,
Abigail agreed to table a report o f Mackenzie's prosecution of J. Y.
Neilson, the form er Royal Commissioner [50],
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appearance, M ackenzie had prosecuted Neilson as if to prove his zeal and
his impartiality in his dealings with both miners and managers. The real
object o f M ackenzie's prosecution of Neilson, it seems, was that it
afforded him an opportunity to gain a measure of revenge against a
person who had assailed his dynamite theory. Although Neilson had not
explicitly ridiculed Mackenzie's dynamite plot, Mackenzie held that
Neilson's criticism was implied because of Neilson's contribution to the
summation delivered by the Commissioners [51].
Abigail's cooperation with a request made by M elville to table
the report of The Crown versus The Newcastle Coal Company did not
have the effect that either Abigail or Mackenzie wanted.

Abigail's

contrived cooperation was in part due to his objection to the magistrate's
criticism o f the Department of Mines and because he had demanded an
apology from the Department of Justice. Once the transcript o f the court
case was tabled, rather than saving the reputations of the Department of
Mines and M ackenzie, it further harmed them. The presiding magistrate,
Mr. Robert J. Perrott not only criticised Mackenzie for his dereliction of
duty at Neilson's W allsend mine, but also virtually accused both
M ackenzie and Rowan of being responsible for the explosion at Bulli.
Yet, apart from a fine o f £1, Neilson was only mildly
reprimanded by the magistrate. On the other hand, Mackenzie, who had
to take Neilson to court because the CMRA had no provision for
prosecution under its own auspices, was rebuked severely by the
magistrate. To Perrott's amazement no arrangements had been made by
M ackenzie to rem ove miners from a gaseous section of the Wallsend
mine as required by Section 12 of the CMRA [52]. Neilson, who had
been critical o f the ventilation at the Bulli mine during the Commission,
permitted a far m ore serious ventilation deficiency in his mine. Between
Mackenzie's and inspector Dixon's original inspections on 5 January 1888
and Dixon's subsequent visit 20 days later, miners had continued to work
even though M ackenzie had full knowledge of the emission of several
blowers [53], Evidence indicated that one day before the hearing on 7
March, 1888, the mine was still in the same gas laden condition [54[.
Perrott's denunciation of M ackenzie was fully justified.
Inspector Dixon stated under examination in court that '(o)n the
5th. of January the mine was dangerous and defective and tending to the
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bodily injuries o f the persons working there’ [55],

Yet Mackenzie,

indifferent to the situation, did not perceive any immediate danger. To
Perrott's consternation, M ackenzie had inspected the gaseous section with
a naked light [56]. M agistrate Perrott found that neither the inspector nor
the examiner, 'took the cause laid down by law where a mine is
dangerous' [57].

During this case there was frequent mention of the

laissez-faire attitude at Bulli by officials o f the Department of Mines and
by m anagers and officials of the Bulli Coal Mining Company. Speaking
for the defence, Mr. W ant became so enraged by the mention of Bulli that
he exclaimed:
(i)t seems to me your worship that there is a great amount of
feeling being imported in this case. Bulli, Bulli, Bulli!,
to which the magistrate retorted:
(i)f danger existed in the mine, it was quite right that the
Inspectors warned by the accident at Bulli should have attention
drawn to it.
Mr. Edmunds for the prosecution said:
(c)ertainly your worship, the officers would not be doing their
duty unless they were m ade m ore active and watchful by this
Bulli accident.
To which Perrott replied:
I have read a great deal about this Bulli accident and I have
com e to the conclusion that great catastrophe would not have
occurred if these men had done their duty [58],
It seems that the magistrate's impeachment of Mackenzie and his
subordinates was a trenchant criticism which should have also been
levelled at the administrators as well as the creators of the 1876 CMRA.
Parliamentarians and agents o f this legislation stood by in an unconcerned
manner until the events of Bulli precipitated a situation which forced
them to reflect on their past inactivity. The CMRA required only a small
fine for a serious breach of the kind committed by Neilson. No charges
had been laid against those responsible for the disaster at Bulli and not
even the horror o f that event prompted alterations to rectify the glaring
deficiencies in the CMRA.
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An editorial in the Daily Telegraph one week after the Bulli
disaster ominously forecast this continued sham, stating that it was:
to be feared however, that too much confidence has been placed
in the supposed absence of explosive gas in our coal mines. Nay
m ore as we pointed out on a form er occasion this over
confidence has purposely been fostered and encouraged by a
certain class of interested persons, for reasons which will be
obvious to those acquainted with the subject. Any attempt to
create a "scare" has invariably been put down with the strong
hand o f authority [59],
It seems that the parliamentary system was infiltrated with coal interests
to such an extent that little or any remedial action was forthcoming from
M acquarie Street. In addition, a false sense of safety permeated the entire
coalmining industry. M iners believed that they were working in a safe
industry. Other than the protection of their investment it was not in the
interest o f coalm ine owners to observe the CMRA to the letter. During
the nineteenth century injury or death did not place the legal obligations
on them

which would eventuate with the evolution of workers'

compensation legislation during the twentieth century. Disasters of the
magnitude o f Bulli were unknown.

Consequently, with regard to their

investment in technology and property coalmine owners played a Russian
roulette.

Despite their callous disregard for life, substantially these

judgements were very shrewd. During the nineteenth century Bulli was
the only large scale disaster.

During the twentieth century, with the

exception o f the Mt. Kembla accident, mining disasters resulting in the
deaths o f large numbers of miners have also been rare. The Department
of M ines inspectorate was unable or unwilling to enforce legislation
which was inherently weak in any event. The depressing conclusion is
that the false sense of security miners had about their work surroundings
and work practices not only endangered their own lives, but also became
an article o f faith. The watered down coalmining legislation that passed
through Parliam ent by the actions o f parliamentary coalmine owners
legitimated the unsafe practices that became part of coalmining.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7 Lessons from the Past
As the evidence of M ackenzie's prosecution of Neilson indicates,
the immediate impact of the Bulli disaster within the coalmining
fraternity was short-lived and minimal.

In terms of making any

significant im pact on the coal mining industry, the lessons learnt from the
Bulli disaster were few.

Naked lights were re-introduced in the Bulli

mine before 1890 and only 12 years later similar circumstances
contributed to the Mt. Kembla disaster. Such events were the norm and a
cursory review of selected events in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries reinforces the contention that actions intended to
m ake coal mines safer were largely cosmetic in nature.

Unsafe work

practices continued to flourish and legislative changes made little impact
on conditions - and unsafe workplace behaviour persisted. During this
period official inquiries seemed to have little impact. Even in the latter
half o f the twentieth century few changes were made in coalmines in
order to make them safer workplaces.

In fa c t unsafe work practices,

either m aintained or tolerated by m any involved in the coalmining
industry, had become so institutionalised that no amount of legislative
change, official inquiry or dedication to duty by Department of Mines
officials could make coalmines safe working places.
During the 1890s, despite an obvious need for improved safety
precautions, legislative change was slow. Even so, as a result of changes
in key personnel within the Department o f Mines there was an attempt to
improve safety measures. Although long overdue, the 1896 CMRA was a
vast improvement over the 1876 Act.

Furthermore, the departure of

M ackenzie and others from the Coal Fields Branch had an effect on the
Branch in the execution of its duties. Nevertheless, the new inspectorate
was not sufficiently committed to making the necessary improvements in
coalmining which may have prevented the Mt. Kembla disaster of 1902.
The new chief inspector, Alfred Atkinson, was appointed in 1897. He
was determ ined to enforce the new legislation. However, inspections of
coalmines were few and far between.
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provisions to pursue the prosecution of managers, was easily evaded.
Furthermore, owing to the long legacy of the neglect of safety issues, the
coalmining industry had become very resistant to change. As a result,
progress was minimal. Although Atkinson persisted he only managed to
secure m inor and, arguably, cosmetic changes, even though these
modifications were significant given the mining industry's resistance to
change. For example, most probably out of recognition that the primitive
and isolated nature o f m ost mines precluded speedy medical services,
Atkinson instigated a scheme in 1897 under which miners were trained in
first-aid.

The New South Wales Government Ambulance Corps

administered the course and drew on the experience of Atkinson as one of
its advisers and utilised medical practitioners as instructors.

In the

Southern district the first classes were held at Bulli and attracted 38
students o f whom 20 gained certificates [1].
Atkinson also vigorously prosecuted managers and owners for
all offences including those not related to safety [2],

Atkinson was

particularly zealous in the execution of his duties in cases such as the gas
and coal-dust explosion at the Dudley colliery at Newcastle on 21 March
1898 which resulted in the loss of 15 lives. Subsequent to the mandatory
Coroner's Inquest, the large loss of life as a result of the explosion was
investigated further by a parliamentary inquiry under a special provision
of the 1896 CMRA [3].

Headed by a well known barrister and later

N.S.W. premier, G. C. W ade, the inquiry obscured the role of the
m anagement and the district inspector in relation to the unsafe ventilation
of the mine. Rather than make public the weakness of the ventilation at
Dudley which resulted in the accumulation of gas, the evidence showed
that the ventilation was conducted in the same defective way as it had
been at Bulli [4], At Dudley, as at Bulli, the efficiency of the ventilation
was also entirely dependent on sets of single regulating doors which were
placed irresponsibly on main transport roads which also served as the
main ventilation intakes.

In such circumstances, these doors were

frequently opened to let the sets of skips through, resulting in the
dispersal o f ventilated air.

The ventilation was neither conducted

properly to the face [5] nor were inspections conducted ' ... in accordance
with General Rule 4' [6].
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T hat such irresponsible behaviour continued at Dudley despite
Atkinson's genuine desire to im prove safety is not surprising.

The

industry's entire economic well-being depended on what can be termed as
a 'conspiracy of complacency' which was ascribed to by owners,
managers, subordinate officials and Department of Mines inspectors. It
was also reflected in the conduct o f contract and day-wage workers [7],
The principal ethos of the coalmining industry was to produce as much as
possible with the regard for life and limb subject to this economic
prerogative.

Indeed, even off-hand labourers' wages depended on the

num ber o f days m iners worked because they were paid by the day and
were laid off on those days when no coal was required [8], Even after the
1901 N.S. W. Industrial Arbitration A ct all mineworkers tried to produce
m ore under the mistaken assumption that increasing amounts of coal
maintained high prices. In reality, what they were doing had the opposite
effect.

Despite the industry's aversion to stockpiling, the greater the

productivity the cheaper the price of coal became which in turn placed
pressure on the rates for hewers and other contract workers to decrease.
Until the N.S.W. coalmining industry's predisposition to over-produce
ceased with the outbreak of W orld W ar II, for all mineworkers, over
production

m eant the

industry

was

characterised

by

intermittent

employment.
The disregard of safety by contract workers in general and
hewers in particular remained a prominent feature of daily routine - as
described above, time was money.

Consequently, out of economic

necessity the playing down o f danger became commonplace and the
acceptance of danger was regarded as a normal part of work.
Transgressions against safety regulations were frequent and when these
were reported they were punished with indifference, generally with the
imposition o f a small fine. In a similar vein, the disregard of gas and
other dangerous occurrences was simply shrugged off by management
and men as mundane features of working life. As a result, the lessons
from the past in terms of safety issues were rarely heeded. Dangerous
practices becam e such a normal part of the daily work routine that they
were passed on from generation to generation. This tradition, maintained
in the close-knit coalmining communities o f N.S.W. until the 1950s, was
reinforced through the custom o f sons following their fathers into the
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same mine. Even after the creation of the Joint Coal Board in 1947, when
the coalm ining workforce was increasingly drawn from non-traditional
mining communities, work practices forged over more than a century
persisted [9].

O f course, this normalisation of danger contained the

potential for disaster.

Even at the time of writing, a bravado persists

among m any in the coalmining industry which has the ingredients for
calamity.

The belief in the modernity and efficiency of ventilation,

reinforced by a m isplaced sense of security, led to the explosion of an
accumulation o f gas at the M t Kembla mine in 1902 and the Appin mine
in 1979.

Sim ilar attitudes can be attributed as causes o f the Bulli

explosion of 1887 and the Stockton disaster of 1896.

At the Stockton

colliery near N ew casde at the time the 1896 Bill was completing its
tortuous passage through Parliament, an emission of non-explosive gas
asphyxiated and killed two men on 2 December. On the following day
black-damp killed another nine miners [10].

Rather than following a

course of inquiry based on the 'blaming the victim' syndrome, the
Stockton inquests are notable because like the Bulli inquest they did not
find fault with the actions o f the miners. The Stockton inquests caused a
furore because the result of the second inquest was not the usual trite
'accidental death' verdict, although the first inquest jury had decided on
the stock-in-trade verdict of accidental death.

As a result o f the Bulli

inquest, under the 1896 Act both juries were precluded from being chosen
from employees or management [11], However, relatives of victims and
local

business

disqualified.

people

serving

miners

or management were

not

This leaves some doubt concerning the loyalty of either

party to managem ent or miners - a complication which would have had a
bearing on the inquest outcomes. W hat is deserving of attention is that
not even a community in which violent deaths were commonplace and a
community which wholeheartedly subscribed to the blame the victim
syndrome could blame the miners in the course of the second inquest.
The jury was unable to agree and was discharged without a verdict being
delivered.

Doubts over managerial or governmental wrongdoings were

quashed by a parliamentary inquiry.
The norm alisation of danger underground was widespread. To
die hewer the cutting and positioning of a sprag or the erection of a prop
was dead work which prevented output.
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safety precautions suited the hewers' and coalmine owners' mutual
interest with owners considering timbering a necessary but onerous
expense. The mutually beneficial 'cutting of comers' applied to a whole
range o f coalmining procedures.

These were constantly modified,

especially after the 1890s, in order to satisfy subsequent alterations in
legislation and the changing demand in quality of coal.

For example,

after the turn of the century the previously forbidden practice of
grunching or shooting coal out o f the 'solid' without undercutting and
nicking becam e permissible. Traditionally, grunching was a proscribed
practice because it was considered dangerous by owners and the
Departm ent of M ines.

It was also seen as 'uncraftsmanlike' by some

miners. The supposed dangers attached to grunching were only a pretext
in order to prevent the production of the then unsaleable slack, the line
dust deemed unsuitable for coalbuming combustion chambers, which the
m ethod created in abundance. However, after the 1890s when a number
of modifications were made to furnaces which enabled the burning of
slack, for which miners were only paid a fraction of round coal, the
dangers of grunching disappeared. In fact, later in the twentieth century
grunching was encouraged and even legitimised by law in 'naked light
m ines’.
The

conspiracy

of complacency

also brought about the

circumstances that resulted in the Mt. Kembla disaster. Miners at Mt.
Kembla were well aware of the laxity in safety procedures and that
managers and other officials had not taken adequate precautions against
the presence of explosive gas. One of the central issues discussed during
the various inquiries into the Mt. Kembla disaster was whether or not the
use o f locked safety lamps should be enforced.

However, there was

opposition to this proposal from m any quarters, including the miners
themselves.

In brief, aside from the explanations offered above, the

universal introduction of safety lamps failed for a number of reasons.
Although the interactions between miners and coalmine owners had
altered little over the intervening fifteen years between the Bulli and Mt.
Kembla disasters, the nature of parliamentary politics had changed and
now appeared to be superficially in favour o f miners. The Labor Party
had been created and had entered the N.S.W. Parliament, with mixed
success since 1891. However, many of its parliamentary members were
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former m iners.

Even so, the expedient nature o f party politics,

parliamentary delaying tactics and the rejection by miners o f the use of
safety lights as well as the coalmine owners' traditional opposition to the
introduction o f safety lamps on economic grounds or any other safety
devices that required substantial monetary outlays all combined to impede
the progress o f legislation of any kind as a result of the M t Kembla
disaster.

In the words of Piggin and Lee, 'the killing would continue'

[ 12].

In The Mt Kembla Disaster, Piggin and Lee (1992) contribute to
the unmasking of the inadequacy of government inquiry and the
shortcomings o f coalmines legislation. They also highlight the need for
further examination o f government response in particular and the role of
government in general in the creation and maintenance o f safety
regulation in coalmines. The Mt Kembla Disaster also demonstrates that
until 1912 when an entirely new CMRA was enacted the lessons from the
past were generally unheeded.
The benefits accruing from the 'conspiracy o f complacency' were
so pervasive that under 1876 and 1896 CMRA both management and
miners schemed together to deceive Department o f Mines inspectors
when they were measuring ventilation [13] which was not supposed to
fall below a minimum of one hundred cubic feet per minute for each man,
boy and horse 114], However, owing to the unpredictability of furnace
ventilation which was easily affected by temperature or wind changes, the
quantity and quality o f air frequently fluctuated [15]. To prevent their
mine from being closed down until the ventilation was rectified, miners,
with the know ledge of colliery officials, temporarily sealed off entire
sections with brattice to augment the ventilation while the inspector
measured the air current. M ost probably the 'brattice trick' was employed
in the Southern district until the late 1920s when the last large mine using
furnace ventilation switched to engine driven fan ventilation like the other
mines in the Illawarra area. These breakthroughs improved ventilation to
such a degree that the brattice trick became redundant.
Collusion between managers and inspectors was rife. Most of
these men cam e from England, W ales and Scotland and had either
worked together in various capacities in their homeland or in N.S.W.. If
they were properly certificated there was a strong possibility that they
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would have attended one of the few mining schools in Great Britain [16].
Although there was no provision in the 1896 CMRA or in subsequent
legislation

that required

inspectors

to

make

unannounced

visits,

frequently inspectors gave notice of an intended inspection a few days
ahead o f time in order to enable managers to get their mine in order.
Today, inspectors are frequently appointed from the ranks of mine
managers and it has been suggested that the practice of announcing
intended inspections persists. Generally, it has been suggested that most
mineworkers know when an inspector is due by the flurry of action to
'clean up' the mine [17].
Due the remoteness of Department of Mines inspectors to
everyday mining activity, the task of frequently inspecting mines is an
arduous one.

It is certainly probable that inspectors are unable to take

account of infractions of regulations that may occur in their absence. In
recent times, the equivocation of some inspectors when confronted with
transgressions of the CMRA has earned them stinging 'nick-names' [181.
Deputies and overmen were the intermediary officials who
mediated between management and mineworkers in the 'conspiracy of
complacency'.

Under the 1896 A ct overmen and deputies were not

explicitly recognised other than as 'competent persons' [19]. However,
through the devolution of vicarious responsibility from the manager they
were legally responsible for the general safety underground [20] and
ostensibly were employed as safety officers.

Their obligations by law

were manifold, but commonly these were so subordinated to the
supervision of labour and mine organisation that their safety duties were
scarcely m ore than a cursory inspection o f work places. By attempting to
serve two masters, minor officials were enmeshed in a perennial struggle
between the two necessary, but often conflicting roles.

Despite the

importance to owners of observing statutory obligations to protect
property and life, a deputy's prime function was to maintain production.
To accomplish this demanding task, deputies had to coordinate a wide
range of a mine's essential functions. Under the 1896 Act the deputy's
statutory duties began before day-shift with an inspection for gas and a
test of the ventilation, roof and ribs of each workplace. The condition of
the ventilation or any damage was supposed to be entered into a report
book.
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Besides being answerable for the safety o f the workplace before
the commencement of the day shift, the deputy was also responsible for
inspecting the ventilation, machinery below and above ground, the
travelling shafts (if any) [21], the headgear and the chains and ropes [22],
The deputy was also accountable for fencing-off any disused sections and
was enjoined to prohibit anyone from entering gassy sections [23], If gas
was detected regularly and the use o f safetylamps enforced then the
deputy was also responsible for their locking. The adherence to these and
other safety precautions was accepted or rejected by management,
generally as finances directed. The only pit in the Southern district where
most of the Act was observed was the Metropolitan which in 1902 during
the course of the Mt. Kembla inquiries was considered a marvel because
D. A. W. Robertson, the manager, ‘enforced the use o f locked
safetylamps. A t all the other Illawarra mines the use of safetylamps was
not strictly enforced because of the extra 3d. per ton ]24] demanded by
the miners for working under the dim, flickering, orange light given off
by safetylamps. This arrangement was mutually acceptable, as owners
were often unwilling to grant the additional payment and the miners
claimed the light impeded their productivity.
Illawarra managers invariably appointed m ore than one deputy,
an overman, a fireman to check the airways, a lampman to test the lamps,
or simply a solitary deputy, or maybe a few in larger mines to meet the
barest requirements of the law and to afford the minimum protection to
their investment. After the deputy's morning statutory obligation, most of
the day was absorbed by supervising duties which meant that the
supplementary inspections required by the A ct were often foregone [25].
The hub of mine production was the face.

The economic

viability o f m ines depended largely on the productivity of the hewers who
not only had to be regularly serviced with skips but also supplied with
'bridging rails', temporary skiprails, timber and brattice. The deputy, who
was responsible for the delivery of these necessities also directed the men
who bratticed, timbered and generally performed maintenance work
outside and near the vicinity of working places. From the 1896 Act
onward, in all m ines determined gassy by the Department of Mines, a
deputy or shotfirer also had to fire all shots. However, shotfirers were
generally not employed in the Southern district until that position was
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o
made mandatory by the 1912 Act. O f course, it was unrealistic to expect
that the deputy, who was burdened by all the other duties described
above, would also have time to go on foot several times a day to
workplaces which might be hundreds o f yards apart in order to fire shots
[26],
Any deputy or mine official who did not partake of the
conspiracy o f complacency was victimised.

There were two cases of

victimisation which merited special attention. In 1899 a Parliamentary
inquiry under G. C. Wade investigated the dismissal of deputy Bailey
from the Newcastle Coal Co. three days after he had detected firedamp.
Wade found that the deputy had been instructed on a previous occasion
not to report firedamp but ad d ed ,'... that Bailey was dismissed for making
known the existence of gas I am unable to say' [27]. In 1903 a Royal
Commission investigated deputy Joseph Lowe's allegations concerning
his dismissal after reporting gas at the Seaham colliery [28].
The subordination of safety by officials to the needs of
production was a well established British custom practised in N.S.W.
since the beginning of coalmining and implicitly legitimised in the 1876
Act.

U nder this Act, neither manager, overman nor deputy were

recognised, nor were their many duties specifically designated.

The

entire responsibility devolved from the owner to a vaguely defined agent
[29], The paucity of legally enforceable safety regulations between 1876
and 1896 for underground officials encouraged the growth of a
recklessness which became an accepted part of coalmining. It spread as
coalmining becam e a large industry from the late 1870s and was not
entirely checked by the innocuous 1896 Act nor by any subsequent
legislation in the twentieth century. In part this was due to the duality of
the role o f m ine officials who were charged under law to protect the
safety of life and limb, but who also had to ensure that the production
process ran smoothly.

Frequently, this would occur at the expense of

safety. U nder the 1912 CMRA deputies, shotfirers, undermanagers and
m anagers continued to serve two masters whose objectives were
antagonistic. There is no evidence which suggests that this situation has
been resolved under current legislation.
W hile there is no doubt that the 1912 CMRA and its amendments
were a vast improvement over any other Act that preceded it, the question
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of the process o f observance of the 1912 legislation, which was in force
as recently as 1984, is one that remains. Arguably, it could also be said
that the present legislation, the 1982 CMRA, (proclaimed 1984), makes
mines safer, although some critics claim that it gives too much latitude to
managers in decisions where safety is a factor.

Aside from the

equivocations o f inspectors, the inclination to internalise or normalise
danger was as prevalent under the 1912 Act as it was under previous
legislation.

The tradition remains under current legislation.

In part,

current malpractices have a tradition as long as coalmining itself and
many traditions have more recently been reinforced by the introduction of
the production bonus in the mid- to late 1950s despite a change in the
composition of the mining workforce since the end o f W orld W ar II at the
behest o f the Joint Coal Board. The contention here is that despite the
strenuous opposition by the Miners' Federation to its introduction, since
the 1960s introduction of the production bonus paid across the board to
the m ajority of employees on mine sites, the tendency to overlook safety
procedures has increased. An analysis o f accident rates tends to support
this view. W hile there is no doubt that since its introduction the bonus
has increased productivity prodigiously, it has also fostered a propensity
to cut com ers with respect to safety. The inclination to normalise danger,
a characteristic em bedded in all ranks of the mining workforce since the
industry's inception, was again reinforced by the bonus. The result has
been a fall in safety consciousness, abetted consciously or unconsciously
by all who partake in the bonus - from the 'Feds' (members of the former
Miners' Federation) to tradesmen, deputies and higher company officials.
In other words, the conspiracy of complacency accommodated the
payment of the bonus.
Notwithstanding the laxity in the policing of safety breaches by
inspectors and in spite o f advances in technology such as roofbolting, the
erection of rib-props or rib-doweling, high velocity ventilation and
improved underground lighting, danger is always present underground.
Regardless of safety precautions, roof sections can still collapse, often
without warning. Large volumes of methane can appear suddenly or ribs
may burst unexpectedly. There is no human agency that can prevent such
occurrences. At best, safety measures furnish uncertain protection against
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unforeseen circumstances only when safety regulations are meticulously
observed.
One of the temptations of the bonus, however, is that it entices
individuals to commit acts which go beyond limits for which safety
measures were intended. The result may be a major disaster like the one
which occurred at the Appin m ine in 1979 when 14 men were killed by a
methane explosion under circumstances which were not satisfactorily
explained in official terms.

Thankfully, disasters of the magnitude of

Bulli and Appin have been rare. The more common result of the bonus'
enticem ent is for individuals to commit acts which are not breaches of
safety regulations but which cause injury to offenders ranging from minor
to serious.
The range of transgressions against safety is varied and by no
m eans are they universally practised. Indiscretions also vary from those
which result in minor injury to the offender and which do not affect
safety, to actions which may result in large loss of life. From the 1960s
until the time o f writing, while common minor indiscretions caused
personal injury they do not necessarily endanger the lives of others. Such
peccadillos include lifting o f weights beyond an individuals' capacity,
resulting in muscular and skeletal injury, and the misuse of tools which
cause eye injuries or minor wounds to the limbs.

Other forms of

m isconduct that may cause injury to others include careless driving of
vehicles in roadways so as to crush individuals against props or rib-sides;
leaving derelict equipment in the lesser, usually unlit roadways, creating
hazardous obstacles and not 'sounding' the roof before commencing work,
thereby inviting roof-falls with possible fatal consequences. However, it
is not the intention to argue that the kind of behaviour outlined above is
typical o f the coalmining industry. Rather, the point is that the bonus has
the potential to increases the incidence of such behaviour.
Generally, the most dangerous offences occur at the face. There
are many serious types of misconduct at the face which may turn mines
into disaster areas.

For example, it was common practice since the

introduction of continuous miners [30] during the 1960s to advance the
face ahead of the last roof support as permitted under the Special Rules of
the 1912 CMRA [31]. This procedure was resorted to in order to delay
die interruption to production required to secure straps to the roof with
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roofbolts. Instead, mineworkers permitted continuous miners to advance
several times the distance prescribed by law and secure two, three or
more sets of straps and roofbolts in one operation. By these omissions
they increased production by avoiding the mandatory individual pauses
which created discontinuity to production and affected the bonus
adversely.
The failure to provide systematic roof support makes a collapse
of a roof a distinct possibility and can result in hundreds of tons of
superincumbent strata subsiding.

It is no surprise that despite the

universal application o f roofbolting, roof-falls have been one of the most
prevalent causes o f death underground [32],

Another common safety

infraction has been to cut headings wider than the statutorily permitted
maximum to increase the shift's output.

By 'robbing the pillars' the

additional pressure created causes the 'crush' on the ribs to increase to
such an extent that random rib-bursts capable of killing men could erupt
suddenly without warning.
W hile roof and rib-falls have been the m ost common cause of
death and injury they are not necessarily the most dangerous occurrences.
The potential for death and injury arise from the frequent transgression of
CMRA regulations governing the prevention of methane explosions.
W hile fatal gas explosions have been rare this century, malpractices in
gassy conditions are habitual and can turn mines into powder-kegs.
Ironically, the vigorous enforcement of CMRA ventilation regulations by
the Joint Coal Board which compelled management to install ventilation
systems powerful enough to sweep away any quantity of gas also created
a false sense of security. Because it was self-evident that ventilation was
much stronger than ever before, mineworkers became increasingly
inclined to take risks. Due to the changing composition of the workforce,
by the time the bonus became almost universal during the 1960s, selfdeception about the dangers o f gas was the norm.
The inclination towards risk-taking was especially fuelled by the
bonus. It became common practice to by-pass the methanometers, fail
safe devices on continuous miners which automatically stopped the
machine if concentrations of gas reached dangerous proportions.
Likewise, portable methanometers suspended in the optimum position
from the roof near the face were deliberately damaged.
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continuous m iner drivers, as well as deputies, did not always test for gas
in gassy places at the statutorily prescribed half hour [33] so as not to
hold up production. Indeed, one o f the attractions of the introduction of
continuous production with four overlapping shifts in 1971 was to avoid
this procedure which was otherwise mandatory between shifts.
Under normal circumstances, these and other omissions are
inconsequential even if they result in small fires which are quickly
extinguished. However, a sequence of unusual occurrences can turn an
apparently innocuous omission into a holocaust. Such was the case at the
Bulli colliery on 9 November, 1965 when a fire caused by the ignition of
a body of inflammable gas killed four men and seriously injured three.
On this occasion the accident was confined to the ignition o f gas in a
small heading, but could easily have been an instantaneous explosion
affecting the entire mine [34], The mandatory investigation appointed by
the M inister for Mines by virtue of Section 31 of the CMRA under
Supreme Court Judge A. Goran originally apportioned no blame to
anyone. This is a fairly predictable result of this type of inquiry and the
mandatory inquests for lesser accidents owing to the conspiracy of
complacency.

The report was mainly confined to recommending

amendments to the CMRA [35], In a supplementary report requested by
the M inister, Judge Goran found no evidence of culpable negligence
under common law, but recommended the issue of summonses for minor
offences under the CMRA [36] - another typical outcome and one not
dissimilar to the inquiries held into Bulli in 1887 and Mt. Kembla in
1902.
A t the Appin mine on 24 July 1979, gross neglect under gassy
conditions and the illegal reversal of temporary ventilation in a longwall
panel caused a gas explosion which killed 14 men. Like Bulli 14 years
before, there was much breast-beating over the loss of life by the mining
fraternity.

Yet, despite private admissions by many in the Southern

district that the 'accident' occurred due to the cutting of comers, no public
acknowledgement was given to the connection between unsafe practices
and the bonus. Instead, face-saving grief in public disguises the dangers
induced by the bonus. There is a familiar echo about these reactions to
large loss of life in coalmining disasters.

At Bulli in 1887 and Mt.

Kembla in 1902, economically driven industry practices convinced
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miners and officials o f the adequacy of the prevailing safety conditions.
As at Appin, m ineworkers were so inured to danger that they felt that
disaster would never overtake them.

O f course, disasters of the

magnitude of Bulli, Mt. Kembla and Appin are rare and some cold
comfort can be drawn from this.
However, in the context of Bulli, few lessons have been learnt
from the past. Despite high velocity ventilation and mining technology
and techniques superior to Appin, aside from being innately dangerous
workplaces, unsafe practices make work in coalmines far more hazardous
than it needs to be. The inquiries held into the Appin disaster revealed
that faulty workmanship under gassy conditions by an electrician and an
illegal reversal o f a temporary ventilation system caused the explosion.
The outcome o f the Appin disaster inquiries have an all too familiar ring
about them. The sad conclusion is that history may repeat itself and that
calamity may strike again.
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APPENDIX A
The letter from J. Y. Neilson to F. W. Binney, referred to in Chapter
Three o f this book, is set out below.
W allsend

2nd September 1888

F.W. Binney Esq.
My D ear Sir
As you know that with the exception o f Fletcher I have had more
experience of strikes in this Colony than any other Colliery M anager in
the district. This added to m y intimate knowledge of the men you have to
deal with ought to give some weight to my suggestions therefore, I will
briefly give you of m y ideas on Strikes.
I may preface my remarks by saying that all my opinions are
formed on the premises that there are no conflicting interests or difference
of opinion inside the Master's Association, or in other words that the
M asters are determined to fight the M iners to the bitter end.
First we m ust find out the character of our enemy which may be
summarised as follows:1st Curley and the delegates
The form er (Curley) is fighting for a big stake inasmuch as
having led the m iners into the breach, and should he bring them out
victorious he will be a hero for a generation and a made man for life and
will fight on the motto that all is fair in love or war, of course if he loses,
he will get all the blame, and suffer the fate of all men who fail to carry
out their promises to Mobocracy, or he will adopt some plan to carry out
the Georginian theory of an equal distribution of wealth. The delegates
are in a similar position to Curley but in a smaller degree and will obey
Curley's orders to the letter until/s/ a pressure is put upon them by the
quiet portion of the miners, and when they (the delegates) see that they
m ust retreat each one will blame the other and all agree to blame Curley.
2nd
About 20% of the miners are thoughtless young men, the
majority of whom do not care how long the strike may last and invariably
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vote tor m ischief, regardless o f consequences, as m any of them are living
on their parents. This is a serious contingent in the miners camp and are
very difficult to deal with.
3rd
You have about 30% ot heads o f families who are agitators, and
who will tor a tim e follow their leaders, so long as there is a visible
agitation and they can daily have their Courage kept up by some new
rumour set afloat by the leaders viz. that "It will all be settled in a day or
two as the m asters are doing so" in fact they (the 30% of agitators) could
not exist unless the struggle assumed some new feature every few days
and their courage is in keeping with their instability, as the least
depressing news would soon make them vent their spleen on the District
officers and delegates.
4th
You have 50% of quiet house holders, and many of them with
their little freeholds who seldom attend any ordinary meetings and even
then have not the m oral courage to vote or speak against any motion with
which they disagree, and if they did they would be m et with the usual
larrikin calls of Put him out, He is a m asters man" etc, etc, and thus for
the sake ol peace they float with the tide; this they will do for a month in
this case, as they will be bouyed up by continuous different reports got up
by the delegates such as, W e are sure to win in a few days as masters are
going to do so and so, or are going to m eet Mr. Brunker or some other
notability etc., at the months end, they will begin to think that matters are
becoming serious and will begin to agitate and express strong opinions in
the little groups at the street comers and make dangerous bullets (which
they dare not fire themselves) and hand them (the bullets) to some of the
30% ot agitators who will without hesitation fire them at the delegates,
then will com m ence the beginning of the end.
The above is a fair description of the men you have to deal with,
and I think that you will agree with me that after a given time, the 50% of
quiet miners are our best allies if they are not day by day supplied with
the usual cry ol "It will be settled in a day or two", and hoping against
hope they keep quiet, and if it is as assumed at the beginning of this letter,
viz, that the Associated Masters intend to fight it out, a most passive
attitude ought to be observed, as few of masters or managers meetings
held as possible and those which are held kept secret and quietly wait the
issue and as miners come out themselves let them ask to go in, but to
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keep finding the miners with rumours will indefinatly postpone a
settlement.
If the above course had been pursued in 1873 strike masters
would have won in six weeks instead o f which all the wavering miners
were clearly fed with rumours of a settlement and in eight weeks the
m asters w ere beaten.
The repeated attempts of outside parties to effect at settlement
has done m ore injury that people in Sydney can understand it has if
possible widened the breach and prolonged the agony and every apparent
concession you have made is looked upon as a syn of weakness on your
part, and I would respectfully recommend you as soon as you get rid of
M essrs Brunker and Creer affair for the Associated M asters to intimate
through the press or through Curley that the Masters do not intend to do
anything m ore until miners apply for a settlement.
A t our managers meeting on 28th ult, I showed my form of
averages o f m iners wages (a copy o f which I sent you) and it was agreed
that each m anager draw up a similar form of averages and have it at our
meeting tomorrow with a view of sending them to you and
recommending them to be published in all the leading papers in the
Colonies, and with the high wages and short hours, it will prevent many
of the workmen in other Unions who are not half as well off as your
m ines from subscribing.
Referring again to the effect o f rumours. Rumour of the 24th
was, m asters will not allow us to bring out tools. Rumour of the 27th
having brought out our tools and m ost masters consented to allow us a
week of syn o f weakness, delegates report that it will be alright in a day
or two. On 29th rumour. No. 1 that Mr. Gregson had run away could not
stand the abuse same date. No. 2 that Mr. Gregson had left home and
would not return for six weeks. This created quite a panic among the
50% men, as they were then sure the masters m eant mischief, then
followed Brunker's arrangement and masters will settle it at their meeting
on Tuesday next and everybody is happy for the time being. I detest
strikes, and 1 can without egotism say that from 1873 to 1884 Mr.
Fletcher and I settled more disputes and prevented more local strikes than
we will ever get credit for, yet in this case the miners are earning higher
wages than ever they have earned for 20 years, and M asters had having
tor the sake o f peace conceded all that honourable men could do, yet still
the m iners come out on strike, and having done all the harm they can to
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the trade, I trust the Associated Masters will unanimously agree to fight it
out to the bitter end.
Your chances o f success in present case are much more
favourable than in any other previous strike inasmuch as now all the
masters are m aking common cause, and have not the Lambton sending in
1000 tons per day and Greta and other smaller Collieries nearly another
1000 tons per day and miners giving 50% of wages as strike money.
If miners win there will be a universal agitation throughout the
Colony for a "M ore Equal distribution of Wealth".
I am Dear Sir
Yours truly
J. Y. Neilson
(Australian Agricultural Company Correspondence. Australian National
University Archives of Business and Labour. Deposit No. E207/19).
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APPENDIX B
The following is one example o f victimisation by the Department of
Mines:
The Boycott
The M ines Act should be amended to penalise any boycotting or
blacklisting of any officials or workmen who report or expose the
existence of dangerous or defective mining conditions. The following
examples have come under m y own observation:1
Jam es Crawford, a deputy at Bulli for some years, described
before the Bulli Commission an occasion in the mine when he told a
miner: "I will not fire this shot for you as the place is full o f gas for
twelve yards back" (see Report o f the Bulli Royal Commission, question
3378, p. 109).
Mr. Craw ford afterwards obtained work as a deputy at another mine.
W hen the M anager and Government Inspector went through the mine, the
Inspector suggestively asked the deputy "if he ever found any yards of
gas now".
(May, J. (n.d.). p. 17)
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